Can we teach an old dogmatism new tricks?
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The mathematical arguments for the existence of parallel universes are arcane in the extreme. Ordinary people can get a rough idea of how the whole thing is supposed to work, but we are certainly not in a position to judge whether, for example, the scientific ‘myth’ which describes how a whole new universe might be squeezed from a black-hole, like a child blowing a soap bubble, is true or even vaguely plausible. For the most part we may be sceptical, even incredulous, but we have come to trust scientists enough, and to distrust our common-sense conclusions about the world enough, not to dismiss these fantastic notions out of hand. Whatever the foibles and prejudices of individual proponents, we sense that such speculation merely pushes the boundaries of an entirely legitimate search for understanding. No less arcane are the claims of astrologers that our lives are influenced by the movements of the planets against the backdrop of the constellations. Although attempts have sometimes been made to provide a scientific rationale for the superstition, the astrological myth presupposes a set of truth conditions very different from those which apply to the scientific myth of parallel universes. In the end, astrology is ‘true’ only because some people persist in claiming it to be true despite overwhelming scientific evidence to the contrary. The theory of multiple universes, on the other hand, remains in principle subject to some sort of empirical or theoretical verification (or falsification) - unless of course, it should be adopted by some religious group or other as a tenet of faith, which in all likelihood has already happened. The question that confronts us is whether, when we assert the truthfulness of Christian beliefs, we resemble more the cosmologists or the astrologers. The point is not that Christianity ought to be provable, anymore than we should expect irrefutable empirical evidence for the existence of parallel universes. It is rather that the ‘theory’ or ‘myth’ of Christianity should be handled truthfully, with intellectual integrity, with a sense of how problematic our treasured notions appear in the cold light of unbelief - which means that we cannot bring out the big stick of dogmatic affirmation every time rational criticism comes knocking at the door. i) Dogmatism still has to do with how things actually are. Although it is always possible to circumvent the process of validation by appeal to a transcendent authority, in the end we have to do with the same either-it-happened-or-it-didn’t reality. We may wish to affirm as a matter of revealed truth that Jesus walked on the surface of the Sea of Galilee, but that does not exempt the event from more rational forms of appraisal. No matter how miraculous it was, it still happened in the real world, was observed and talked about by real people. Faith may give us grounds and motivation for believing but it does not make the story that has been handed down to us any more or less true. Dogmatism only tends to reinforce the schizophrenia of the Christian mind-set. If the truthfulness of the story about Jesus walking on the water is taken to rest on faith, it is likely to be classified as a rather different type of event to the murder of Julius Caesar, for example, the truthfulness of which is a matter of historical and literary enquiry. These different events then tend to generate epistemologically distinct worlds, and the credibility problem looms. Again, we are not claiming that either of these events may be objectively verified. The complaint is rather that the manner in which the church commonly thinks and speaks about the facts of faith short-circuits the normal procedures of rational enquiry - by ignoring the difficulties, for example - and that this, in the end, must undermine the plausibility of the message. Ultimately the commitment to truthfulness must make us suspicious of dogmatism, however much we may be convinced that Christian truth is of an absolute and immutable nature. ii) It is doubtful, in any case, whether the sort of dogmatism that today is used to reinforce the claims of Christian truth is endorsed by the Bible itself. There is simply not the degree of reflection upon itself that might give rise to an assertion of intrinsic authority. Truth in the Bible is relational and experiential; it is also strongly contextualized. It is determined both by the nature of the relationship of people to God, expressed particularly in terms of covenant, and by the concrete circumstances within which a statement is made. This is not to say that truth never has a propositional character, but that propositional statements are rarely made abstractly or systematically, as though such truth existed independently of the endeavour to grasp the reality of a living God in the midst of life. Propositional statements constitute a highly focused and restricted end-point in the process of interpreting and communicating what has been experienced. It is not clear that the process can be reversed so that an authentic experience of God is generated by propositional statements of truth. iii) It is consistent with the gospel to make it available on the home ground of the unpersuaded. In a sense, perhaps, to submit Christian truth to rational enquiry is a concession to those who do not have faith, an aspect of becoming all things to all men (1 Cor.9:19-23). This is not to make either modern rationalism or postmodern irrationalism the final arbiter of truth, Christian or otherwise. Rational enquiry is not an infallible method but a dialectical process of affirmation and revision - often a very chaotic process, offering no more than provisional statements regarding the ‘truth’ of a particular state of affairs. Truth is truth. In the end, rationalism can do no more to suppress truth than faith can do to engender it. iv) Paradoxically, dogmatism tends to encourage an intolerant and disputatious pluralism. If one group can lay down the law regarding absolute truth, so can the next. Truth must be allowed to stand some way apart from all our arguing and pontificating, like some elusive and rare creature, kept in view by our discourse, but not snared and tied down. The intellectual integrity of evangelical discourseIt is a primary objective of this work, therefore, to re-establish the intellectual credibility of evangelical discourse, to bring about a reconvergence of the public and private spheres of thought, to seek to apply consistent standards of truthfulness across the whole spectrum of thinking done by committed Christians, to ground the preached gospel in the honest and critical struggle to understand what happened in the life of Jesus. Much of the necessary groundwork for renewal has already been laid by evangelical scholarship - in rediscovering, for example, the historicity of Jesus - but it has had very limited impact on popular discourse. The scholars are faced with a quandary. A more critical, thoughtful approach to the grounds of faith is bound to open up a gulf between scholarship and popular Christian discourse, to the extent that one will appear dangerously innovative and the other hopelessly naïve and out-of-touch. A tug-of-war will get us nowhere: the most likely outcome is that the rope will break. Scholars and evangelical intellectuals (if the term is not an oxymoron!) will have to infiltrate a complacent and facile evangelical discourse and subvert it from the inside - though no more than popular discourse will have to subvert scholarship in the interests of spiritual relevance. Is the Bible a privileged text?It is an interesting thought-experiment to imagine what would have happened if the early Jewish Christians had been driven from Jerusalem into the desert. What if, under threat of destruction from an invading Roman army, they had concealed their writings in caves and then, like the sectarians of Qumran, had disappeared off the screen of history? And suppose that nineteen hundred years later those writings were discovered by a Bedouin shepherd boy and fell into the hands of a culture that had never known the Christian church. What would that culture make of them? We can hardly subtract the influence of Christianity from modern Western culture, even from modern secular rationalism. But this is only a thought-experiment: how would people react to these writings and their claims about a Jewish teacher called Jesus without all the intellectual baggage of the Code, without the preconception that this a definitive story about God, perhaps without much of an idea about God at all? i) The Code regards the truthfulness of the Bible as a premise, a self-evident postulate, vouchsafed by the simple fact that this is sacred text, the Word of God, as though it carried an irrevocable and unquestionable divine imprimatur. The challenge is to strip the biblical texts of this aura of infallibility, shut down the defensive shield of dogmatism, so that the texts become again what they always have been - a collection of miscellaneous documents generated by a not entirely coherent, ancient religious tradition and by a sectarian movement in the process of breaking away from it. ii) An appreciation of the truthfulness of Scripture must be based on, must begin with, an understanding of the place of these texts within history. This means taking into account their restricted frame of reference, the historical particularity of the issues addressed, and their inherent limitations as sources of information about what actually happened. It also means taking historical-critical scholarship seriously: we cannot legitimately talk about the events of the Bible as history without in principle making use of the same historical-critical methodologies that we apply to other ancient documents. If in the process the biblical texts acquire the status of Word of God, it is as an emergent property, inseparable from the personal discovery that there is something valid, something real, something compelling, in the project of the kingdom of God. iii) Then, of course, it is important that a renewed reading of Scripture be allowed to reshape the tradition, revise the popular, user-friendly, standard definition of faith that provides the practical point of reference for both insiders and outsiders. Here is perhaps where the greatest need lies - for the whole of Christian life to be wrenched into a new alignment with the reality of the gospel of Jesus Christ. Not a superficial reorganization of data but a serious low-level reformatting of the hard drive! The difference between what is and what is said about itFor most purposes truth has to do with the functioning of a three-way correspondence between what is said, what is thought, and what is. This is by no means an uncomplicated epistemological model. What is thought cannot easily be communicated other than through speech; and we know what is only by thinking about things and by articulating those thoughts through speech. We should think of the model, therefore, as a pragmatic, instructive device by which we endeavour to correct certain naïve assumptions about the nature of language and construct a more reasonable, more plausible, account of things. In fact, a number of important corollaries may be drawn from the model. i) Many of the difficulties regarding the plausibility of Christian truth arise because the relationship between speech, thought and reality has become too inflexible and mechanistic. We forget the uncertainty of speech, the inexactness of thought, and suppose that language is a more accurate and stable vehicle for truth than it really is - hence our over-dependence on the Code. Truth lies not in words alone but in the interaction between speech, thought and reality. We acquire truth not simply by reading it off the page, as a supermarket scanner reads a bar-code, but by entering into the dynamic of this interaction. This is the act of interpretation - it entails human responsibility. ii) We encounter a particular problem when the state of affairs described belongs not to the empirical realm but to a transcendent or ideological dimension. Jesus’ death at the hands of the Romans outside Jerusalem belongs to the empirical realm. But to speak of this as an atoning death introduces an ideological element; this is a matter of theological interpretation. It is cast as a statement about reality, but this is a ‘reality’ that is virtually indistinguishable from what is thought. For the purposes of this project we will call this type of speech ‘myth’. It is the theological overlay, that interpretive layer of meaning that is superimposed on empirical reality, ordinary experience. The term is not used pejoratively. It is not intended to bring into the question the truthfulness of what is said; nor does it necessarily mean that the statement or story is to be interpreted non-literally. It simply draws attention to the fact that statements about what is invisible (‘Christ is seated at the right hand of the Father’) or unknown (‘Christ will come again’) are very different to statements (historical, personal, scientific) about normal empirical reality. Traditionally, of course, in the Christian context this sort of myth would be described as ‘revelation’. But ‘revelation’ is one of those self-authenticating terms that pre-empts the process of enquiry. By using the term ‘myth’ we emphasize that this is, at bottom, human speech about God. iii) The instability of language appears not only at the epistemological level. It is also a problem of rhetoric. On the one hand, language may be used figuratively - that is, in a deliberately ambiguous or indirect manner. But rhetoric is more than simply the use of stylistic devices; it is also the use of argumentation. We may define argumentation quite broadly to mean the development of thought in a text - the plot of a narrative or the more logical structure of an argument. The basic problem is that, under the influence of the Code, we expect New Testament argumentation to conform to an abstract systematic theological schema. We read according to the Code. What we overlook is the contingency of the argumentation - the rhetorical context in which the argumentation arose and which must be taken into account if it is to be properly understood. This rhetorical context has a number of different components: the historical circumstances and horizon within which the text arose, the personal situation of the writer or speaker, the role that the text played in debate or controversy. iv) The model allows us to refocus on the what is of truth rather than the what is said. The Code becomes transparent again and we can see what lies beyond it. The myth and ideology of salvation are not made redundant, the theoretical postulate of atonement is not abandoned, but we look through these formulations and see a reality which they represent but with which they are not identical. The reality of salvation has been projected on to the glass screen of human understanding, but the image on the screen is not the reality, nor is it properly the ‘truth’. If we step to one side, we can see the gap between the Code and the reality, we can see that there is an epistemological distance between them. The agenda of the kingdom of GodAlthough to a large extent Christian faith must be embodied in, and mediated through, words and propositions, we should not lose sight of the dynamic, experiential, existential dimension to the gospel. Evangelical Christianity, nervous about the threat from scepticism and rationalism, too often substitutes a belief system for life. The task of maintaining the belief system becomes an end in itself, much as the regulation of the Old Testament sacrificial system became an end in itself, an inherently meritorious activity, rather than the external expression of a viable covenantal relationship. The experience of God naturally gives rise to speech about God, and it is important that this speech be accurate. Doctrine is a distillation of accurate speech about the experience of God. But it is much harder to make the process run in reverse. Doctrine does not so easily induce life, it does not so naturally generate the experience of God. The Spirit gives life, but the letter kills, no matter how accurate the letter may be. The Code is currently a conceptual, systematic, doctrinal structure. Christianity, however, is essentially a historical and existential commitment. The Code, therefore, needs to be restructured around the historical continuity with the agenda of Jesus Christ. It needs to be structured diachronically rather than synchronically. This will entail a different rhetoric, different imagery, different priorities - a pervasive commitment to a historical, contextualized, realistic model of Christian faith. |
Comments
Reason is not in opposition to Revelation
I am interested in exploring this issue of revelation versus human reason a bit. Human reason seems to be essential and necessary in our knowledge of God whether there is revelation or not. Every human action and word requires that another human interpret the information using their reasoning processes. Some have trained their crticial faculties to understand/interpret better than others. Revelation or not, reason is absolutely essential to know anything. Revelation does not bypass the mind, but utilizes and relys on its ability to interpret and comprehend.
When Judaism affirms that God suprasses man’s comprehension, I don’t think they are saying that God makes himself known through revelation instead of reason primarily because revelation is meant/intended to be comprehended/understood by human reason. I think they are saying that there is more to God that we presently know as not everything there is to know about God is revealed. In other words, we do not have and will probably never have an exhaustive knowledge of God. I’m interested to know what others make of this.
Reason Alone?
Good contribution, Hungertruth. I think my earlier comment may have been cryptic. Please let me elaborate..
Christianity places a unique emphasis on belief: The usual definition of a Christian is someone who adhere to a system of beliefs; and beliefs presupposes reason. Thus, when you write that Human reason seems to be essential and necessary in our knowledge of God, your point is quite valid: The importance of reasoning distinguishes Christianity from other religions, where membership is predicated on obedience, ethnicity, adherence to ritual, etc. My point is rather that in Christian theology, reason is considered to fall short: Hence the traditional reliance on faith.
In the world of daily affairs, a belief is the result of inquiry and evaluation. I might express a belief that tomorrow will bring rain. But that belief is a fluid construct: as new information comes in, I revise my outlook. My belief is not emotional: It demands neither allegiance nor defence. I also recognise that my belief falls short of knowledge, and I happily concede that my beliefs may turn out to be mistaken. These are distinguishing characteristics of beliefs based on reason.
Compared with what Christians mean by belief, there are obvious differences: Someone who professes belief in Jesus isn’t saying that, based on a careful evaluation of evidence, he concludes that Jesus is likely to be a supernatural being who can deliver an eternity in paradise through the mere act of belief. Rather, anyone who has talked with a Christian is bound to be struck by the seeming arbitrariness and strength of their emotional attachment. Perhaps this reaction comes from some direct experience of God, if so, then it remain outside the grasp of reason.
I want to examine the heritage of the two threads of the Christian outlook: reason and faith (which we can also call obedience).
Christianity is a hellenised religion, either because Jesus was a hellenised Jew, or, more likely, because many of its early popularisors were Greek. From the Greeks we have the belief that nature can be made to give up her secrets to human intellect, as well as the belief that the attempt would be worthwhile. This outlook is far from obvious. I think it developed independently only once in history. It is the basis for scientific achievement and also seems to be the origin of the Christian notion that God’s nature and intention will reveal themselves to reason.
The early Jewish outlook is quite different. Here man must wait passively for God or His messengers, and when God speaks, it is in the form of a long series of edicts, commands and taboos notably short on explanation. The point is not, as you write, that they are saying that there is more to God that we presently know as not everything there is to know about God is revealed. Rather, the implicit assumption is that God’s plan is outside man’s comprehension. Your remark Reason is not opposed to revelation misses my point as well. What I sought to point out was that reason and revelation are functional equivalents, which are substituted for each other in different religious paradigms.
Although I remain very excited about Andrew’s proposed deconstruction of the Gospels (are you still interested, Andrew?), I am also, very slowly, coming to understand that mystery, or magic, or faith, or obedience, or even fear (whichever you wish to call it) is necessary too. I only half humorously suggested that the project, while worthwhile, was ultimately infeasible. This time I’ll add that mystery/magic/faith/obedience is needed to confer piety.. to confer meaning
Christians Categorically Reject Reason
Let’s see if we can continue to progress and establish some foundations. I wanted to make a few remarks concerning some of the material in your last post.
The importance of reasoning distinguishes Christianity from other religions, where membership is predicated on obedience, ethnicity, adherence to ritual, etc. My point is rather that in Christian theology, reason is considered to fall short: Hence the traditional reliance on faith.
First of all, I’m not so sure that the importance of reason distinguishes Christianity from other religions. I think traditionally/historically, Christians have not typically relied on reason to guide their ideas, but would use reasons insofar as reason backed up their belief system. Secondly, when you state that Christian theology considers reasons to fall short, this seems ambiguous. I agree that most Christian theologies (but not all) would say something like this, but what does it really mean. I think a lot of confusion about ideas of faith and reason begin here.
In the world of daily affairs, a belief is the result of inquiry and evaluation. I might express a belief that tomorrow will bring rain. But that belief is a fluid construct: as new information comes in, I revise my outlook. My belief is not emotional: It demands neither allegiance nor defence.
As you point out, allowing new information to revise older models of belief is beneficial and helpful in the search of truth. Another good point is made when you imply that truth does not need allegiance or defense as it will stand on its own. If one believes something to be true, there should be no fear of opposition, because ultimately how can one knock down what is clearly true. Secondly, if a belief is shown to be false, the believer should simply modify, change, and alter his views. The problem comes into the mix when people identify themselves with a particular tradition or belief and find their own identity by defending and representing a particular viewpoint.
I also recognize that my belief falls short of knowledge, and I happily concede that my beliefs may turn out to be mistaken. These are distinguishing characteristics of beliefs based on reason.
This depends on how you are using the word knowledge. Do we know that Caesar crossed the Rubicon? By modern standards, we usually use the word “know” in this context, but do we know with 100% accuracy? Do we have absolute certainty? No, but what do we know with absolute certainty? It seems that we have a high degree of certainty that he crossed the Rubicon as we do with many historical events. I would place the resurrection of Jesus in this same category. The resurrection of Jesus is the best explanation for the empty tomb. This being said, we should speak in terms of probabilities rather than certainties to be realistic and honest with the evidence.
Compared with what Christians mean by belief, there are obvious differences: Someone who professes belief in Jesus isn’t saying that, based on a careful evaluation of evidence, he concludes that Jesus is likely to be a supernatural being who can deliver an eternity in paradise through the mere act of belief. Rather, anyone who has talked with a Christian is bound to be struck by the seeming arbitrariness and strength of their emotional attachment. Perhaps this reaction comes from some direct experience of God, if so, then it remain outside the grasp of reason.
I can sympathize with your point here. Christians, for the most part, are the most unreasonable people when it comes to logic and reasoned discussion. I think you nailed it on the head when you refer to this emotional attachment that stems from an experience with God that they have had or are having. Once this has occurred, arguments lose their force. It’s like trying to prove to them that their parents don’t exist or do not have an active roll in their life; a big waste of time. Secondly, Christians adhere to logic only when it helps their position. When the law of non-contradiction is applied to their ideas about God (Trinity), Jesus (dual-nature theory), and Bible (dual authorship) etc… they escape contradiction by appealing to mystery, or say something to the extent that their ideas are “above reason”, not “against reason.” The problem with doing this is that anyone can say that their ideas are mysteries, or above reason. This is a flat denial of the problem, not an answer to it.
Christianity is a hellenised religion, either because Jesus was a hellenised Jew, or, more likely, because many of its early popularisors were Greek.
I agree with this entirely. Traditional Christianity is a mixture of pagan/Greek ideas and Jewish/Hebrew theology. The concept of the immortality of the soul is one example. This idea can be found in Platonic philosophy, but nowhere in the Hebrew Bible.
Skeptic, I have enjoyed our discussion and I look forward to hearing back.
One reason why Karl Barth
One reason why Karl Barth re-emphasised revelation was because the Christian message had become unhooked from culture, and Hans Frei took this up with ideas of a non-objective biblical narrative, and Lindbeck the same for doctrine. They stand as forms of drama, community identity through forms of language and speech - postliberalism. The cost is a kind of bubble, a freezing of internal culture. If religion is like language, then it grows and changes and it mixes with other influences. So the retreat involved in Barth and since is an escape from unfriendly culture, and this cannot be right in the longer term.
There is the issue of method here. Science has its method - delayed falsifiabilty. The theory does not work, so it is adjusted a while until it fails, or it exists as a truth as it goes along. History has rules of primary data, and a big debate about methods. It seems to me that a principal problem with Christianity is that it sets up an alternative universe to these methods, for example in how the world was created (when there is a different sceintific account), or in how sinfulness is transmitted (when we have genetics) and it comes from a world view of a three decker universe and glass like spheres. The whole thoery of atonement comes from a time when people believed that illness and death was caused by sin. This is why Jesus and others healed people: he did it to ready them for the demanding, coming, Kindom of God. Meaning was and shifted around as a sacred canopy, the explanation. All this is, I consider, dead. So religion now is more like art. It is a ritualistic reflection on where we are going as a community and individuals. It is both time out and time in for this reflection and action. This means how we interact with others and the world about us. It can draw on the resources of a tradition in order to interact, and the eucharist for example is an exchange of the gift (giving and receiving) as part of reflection. Music, thinking and silence are all important. But the tradition is ancient, the sacred canopy is entirely gone (except for sectarians) and it should not be expected to do what it cannot do. So I see Christianity as a text resource and means to an end, as indeed are the resources of other faiths and philosophies, and I see it as an art form among others in this culture.
Barth, reason, revelation and pendulums
It’s my opinion that the impact of Barth was to push the pendulum away from a theology that was in thrall (because of modernistic culture) to historical-criticism: the belief that the scriptures can only be truly understood by the objective tools of historical understanding (according to a contemporary historical methodology) and ‘criticism’ - the attitude of supposed neutrality with regard to the accuracy and interpretation of what the scriptures are saying. This is an interpretation of Barth contrary to your point of view, Pluralist. So Barth made a powerful case for the validity of ‘revelation’ as a way of ‘knowing’.
But since, whatever our view of scripture, the texts accommodate themselves to our understanding in comprehensible language, thought-forms, and a variety of more or less recognisable literary styles and forms, it is inevitable that reason must play a part in probing and exploring its message. But ‘reason’ is never neutral or impartial (as scientific modernistic culture has fraudulently asserted); it brings the presuppositions of every generation and culture to bear upon the understanding of the text. Every reading of scripture, as far as scripture’s theological significance is concerned, is capable of becoming a dialogue between the text and the reader, with his or her imported assumptions.
‘Critical-realism’, as an approach to scripture, suggests to me a valuable interactive process, whereby greater understanding of meaning can be unravelled, as far as text and enquirer are prepared to engage in a mutually critically interactive process.
But Barth reminds us that the scriptural text itself introduces a divine dimension, standing within the text and also over and above it. It is my opinion that in the end it is more than culture which shapes and changes the meaning of the text. Rather, the text stands above culture - critiquing, challenging, and ultimately changing it. Such is the consequence of believing in the divine activity of the Spirit - within and upon the text, and in the mind of the reader, and the community which he or she represents. To my mind, church history as much as dogma bears out the truth of this divine inspiration of scripture.
Barth draws attention to these realities. Maybe, like every contribution to thought, he initiated a pendulum swing - but a swing that would never again return to precisely the same point.
our understanding in
…our understanding in comprehensible language, thought-forms, and a variety of more or less recognisable literary styles and forms
Surely this would be (ultimately) anti-Barth; we know that he understood and likely accepted many of the historical criticisms of the texts (eg virgin birth debate, Herod and Quirinius, and so on evermore) but his point was that the biblical revelation (what he believed God did that became the biblical narrative) intersected history rather than was history. There is a historical meeting point but they are not history as such, which is culture. In doing what he did, write, he expanded what was the intersection.
All text is interactive, it all shapes as well as is shaped, and is all dialogue. I see no difference between the function of all text and biblical text. Once the human entry point is made (if you believe in revelation of this sort) the processes become the same. And in a sense this is why Barth remains the road to atheism. The God is so cut off from culture, so high and dry and invisible, that it is one slight step to disappearance. This was the point of some Barth like writings like Harvey Cox’s The Secular City.
I come at it the other way. God is a product of culture all the way along. We make God, just as we make traditions. My approach (and those of my view) is like one side of a circle coming round where it meets those who take the logic of Barth to where it leads. It led to Frei and Lindbeck and all objective connection is lost, and culture is restored - but in their case frozen. For liberal postmoderns the texts continue to be written, religion continues to form, and there is no artificial cut off date.
Religious traditions and God(s)
Pluralist,
I have an observation and a couple of questions. It is true and easy to see that people continue to write religious texts and so forth, but how does this translate into their not being a Creator or Creators? If there were a God or gods, and he or they acted here and there, during those times when there was no action, wouldn’t you expect people to do just that? Make or create an active God(s) since this is what is desired? As for the last few posts, could you just clarify the main point so that I could understand where you are coming from? Thanks. I look forward to your response.
The main issue is the
The main issue is the relationship between culture and religious doctrine. In the Middle Ages there was no problem, as religion provided explanation and was a sacred canopy. Since the Renaissance and Enlightenment, there has been a growing distance between the way things are commonly explained, which is this worldly and practical, and religious doctrine. The latter has been exposed (I’d say) as a kind of literary fiction, though none the worst for that in terms of carrying out a religious function.
As for people writing about and creating Gods, this in and of itself is neither evidence for nor against God. Whether there is a God or not, the God/s that humans create are still their creations.
The answer from neo-Calvinists like Barth, and postliberals, has been to say culture and doctrine are different, to there is either non-cultural revelation, a zap from outside, people chosen for salvation regardless of how we make this world, or that there should be mini sub-cultures, little communities that define themselves by the inherited doctrine and biblical drama. But this latter approach is to give up on general culture and to freeze religion. Religion should be dynamic, fluid and able to respond to challenges.
God a projection of culture etc
Just responding to your points:
1. In referring to the humanness of language, thought forms etc, I was suggesting how Barth might need to be modified - and how reason always plays a part in interpretation (following the drift of previous posts). However, reason itself always brings its own ‘faith’ presuppositions to bear in the things it investigates; it’s never neutral.
2. You see no difference between the function of all text and biblical text - precisely; but I do - and I believe church history, that’s to say how individuals (including myself), societies and cultures have been changed through the power of Spirit acting on text - is against you (which was my point). My other point was that biblical text operates in one sense like all other texts - which is where we agree.
3. I’m no apologist for Barth, but I’m sure he would be turning in his grave if he heard it said that he ‘remains the road to atheism’. In fact he was forcefully propounding a view which is damaging to yours - that God speaks from outside culture. In that sense, Barth was bringing a healthy and necessary challenge to the culturally conditioned methods of bible interpretation in his time - which were limiting its understanding to the realm of scholars, academics and archaeologists. Where I would want to modify things is by saying that God speaks through culture and into culture - but in turn challenging, changing, or endorsing culture. My argument is that church history bears this out.
4. It’s an interesting exercise to say that God is a product of culture. It bears little examination when subjected to factors such as the historical evidence for the resurrection of Christ, the worldwide (cross-cultural) spread of the church, and the personal experience of changed lives in believers today.
Like hungertruth, I’ve a suspicion that this thread needs to reconnect with its roots; were you proposing your own response to the original ‘Can we teach an old dogmatism new tricks?’
Barth and redeemed reason
I agree, Peter, that Barth has at least initiated a pendulum swing that has never again returned to its precise point. I’d go further and say that postliberal and postevangelical exegesis have their roots firmly in neo-orthodoxy and that the emerging paradigm of the Bible laid out, for example, in Marcus Borg’s The Heart of Christianity and the richness of the approach of a Walter Brueggemann is Barth’s legacy.
I’m interested, though, in the starting point of the swing. It seems to me that what Barth did was to repristinate the understanding that reason is fallen and that natural reason’s instinct is always to create idols. Faced with his teachers’ support of the Kaiser and the German Christian support for Hitler, Barth desperately needed to create a space for the divine “No” to human idols which held the gospel in ideological captivity. This is the motivation behind the reassertion of revelation.
Barth’s understanding of the relationship between culture (or socio-cultural conditioning), reason and revelation is nuanced. He believes in the possibility of and necessity for the transformation of reason - its redemption. Hence his delight at the rediscovery of Anselm’s Fides Quaerens Intellectum. Barth’s attacks on human reason are essentially polemical and need to be taken as somewhat tongue-in-cheek. After all, there is an obvious irony to the fact that the critic of human reason produced such a rigorously tight theological framework of the monumental scope and stature of the Church Dogmatics! Yet this makes more sense if you grant his strong belief in the power of redeemed reason. If Barth’s lifelong opponent is the Schleiermacher of the Speeches, then his answer is the submission of faith: Credo ut intelligam. Belief leads to genuine understanding - and reason is deployed as vigorously and rigorously as anywhere else in Christian theology.
This was a thought provoked from the thread and your posts, rather than a criticism. I feel that it is an important aspect which has been absent from the discussion - important precisely because its legacy has provided a genuine break from the impasse of the post-Enlightenment historical-critical dominance of exegesis.
Barth, Borg, and neo-orthodoxy
Thanks Lawrence. There’s a good review of Marcus Borg/The Heart of Christianity on this site. I’d be very interested if you’d expand your comments on postliberal/evangelical exegesis having their roots in neo-orthodoxy. Did you relate that specifically to Barth, or was it just a comment in general?
Regarding >In fact he was
Regarding >In fact he was forcefully propounding a view which is damaging to yours - that God speaks from outside culture.<
Well there is a price to pay, and that once it enters culture, unless culture is changed, it remains outside, and seeing that he was anti-cultural regarding religion (anti-religion even) it remains a road to a non-objective God and therefore atheism.
I don’t think there is historical evidence for the resurrection. The resurrection is a faith first event. There are no primary sources for it, and it is not open to examination via any historiography. If you take texts of the resurrection, they are clearly mythic in structure and give a theological message for the early church community in each case, and each resurrection text justifies either authority or a liturgical practice or a cosmology of faith. For all that the resurrection is about faith, when the man Jesus died he died as anyone else does, and no cells and genes there were revived.
Reason, Culture, Spirit, and Resurrection
I took comments from a few previous posts in order to ask a few clarifying questions and make a few remarks for each.
But this latter approach is to give up on general culture and to freeze religion
When you speak of general culture, what exactly are you referring to? Are you speaking of the dominant pop culture, because there seems to be culture within culture within culture. It also seems impossible to escape. If God spoke and acted at any given time, I would supose that he would be smart enough to speak in language understandable to the specific people he spoke to. In order to us to understand what was comunicated to a people situated sometime in the past, it would seem inevitable that we would have to understand that peoples culture and time period to better understand the message. I’m not exactly sure how this ties in with Barth saying God speaks outside of culture, or even what that means?
reason itself always brings its own ‘faith’ presuppositions to bear in the things it investigates; it’s never neutral.
What are "faith presuppositions"? I know what presuppositions are, but do not know how the word faith is being used. It is such a tricky word and morphs into so many different things. We need to be really careful how we use this word and define our terms. Presuppositions can be reasoned and thought through before tentative acceptance. When you speak of reason, what are you referring to? I see reason as a way to catagorize and analyze using the laws of logic. Tools are neutral, but people typically are not. I think we need to strive for this as much as possible. Doing theology/philosophy collaboratively is one way to check ourselves and protect ourselves from sloppy or errant thinking.
societies and cultures have been changed through the power of Spirit acting on text that God speaks from outside culture.
This seems to be Christian lingo that has little or no practical value. Every believer claims to powered by this Spirit acting on the text, yet there is no consenus about these texts meaning. We have endless Bible commentaires with a endless variations of interpretation and 34,000 Christian denominations! What’s the use of claiming the Divine Spirit upon ones own take on it if it is not ultimately authoritative?
In that sense, Barth was bringing a healthy and necessary challenge to the culturally conditioned methods of bible interpretation in his time - which were limiting its understanding to the realm of scholars, academics and archaeologists.
As far as Bible interpreations goes, we would be much better off if we listened more to scholars, academics and archaeologists than those unfamiliar with the origional languages, manners, customs, geography, history and the rest of those things which academics study. These people spend their lives studying specialized time periods and we are only hurting ourselves by ignoring them or spending the majority of our reading time on people who think they know what they are talking about but really don’t because they’ve never put in the time, energy, sweet and hard work it is to do and be the real thing.
reason is fallen and that natural reason’s instinct is always to create idols
Again, what does this mean? Are we not able to do mathmatics and science accurately? If we are, then can we not be highly accurate when it comes to the probability of historical events and making tentataive conclusions based on the information we have?
Belief leads to genuine understanding.
This seems to be absent of meaning. Pleae clarify what this amounts to. I may believe that I a semi-truck going 70mph would bounce off my chest like superman, but would this be genuine undestanding?
I don’t think there is historical evidence for the resurrection. The resurrection is a faith first event. There are no primary sources for it, and it is not open to examination via any historiography. If you take texts of the resurrection, they are clearly mythic in structure and give a theological message for the early church community in each case, and each resurrection text justifies either authority or a liturgical practice or a cosmology of faith. For all that the resurrection is about faith, when the man Jesus died he died as anyone else does, and no cells and genes there were revived.
This could be and probably should be a seperate post as this is the rock bottom issue for Christians, or at least it should be. If we don’t have historical precident to think that Jesus really rose from the dead, we are really off the mark. Paul said that if Jesus did not rise from the dead, our faith is in vain, we are still in our sins etc… This is the cornerstone and if removed would have huge consequences. I think this issue deserves better treatment than given above. I recently watched a debate between Richard Carrier and Mike Liconis which showed that the issue is more complicated and difficult than an outright dismissal. There are difficult questions for both positions to answer. This may be a faith first event for most, but not all. There have been people who after studying the evidence, became convinced that Jesus was the human Messiah of Israel, as he claimed to be. I look forward to our continued discussion.
The resurrection, 'faith presuppositions' , religious jargon etc
Pluralist: the resurrection of Christ - by all means deny its historicity, but if you do, you deny the basis of Christianity - and if you talk about a Christian faith without a historical resurrection of Christ, you are talking about something rather different from the Christianity to be found in the biblical texts. But this is a very well worn path - and yesterday’s discussion in the realm of contemporary theological discourse. By the way, if you are saying that cultures create God, isn’t that really another way of saying that God, by definition, does not exist?
Hungertruth: ‘Faith presuppositions’ - rather a pretentious way of saying that nobody approaches scriptural or any other text from a ‘neutral’ or ‘objective’ standpoint; we approach everything from one position of faith or another. There is no route defined by something called ‘reason’ which is free of any kind of bias brought about by ‘faith’. For instance, pluralist rests his position on ‘faith’ as much as any believer in the existence of God. In fact, I would say that pluralist has rather more faith than one who believes in the existence of God.
‘The power of Spirit acting upon text’ - again, shorthand - and I agree, sounding like jargon; the jargon obtains meaning by context; it is my contention that it is not meaningless to talk about a divine imprint on scriptural texts; nor that scriptural texts can be empowered by a divine operation on the reader. By scriptural I refer to biblical scripture. It is not simply the comparison of this scripture with the scripture of other religions which bears this out, but the experience of those whose lives are transformed by the kind of message which biblical scripture conveys, and church history is one way of seeing how this works out. Whatever else is said about Karl Barth, he has brought a seriousness and integrity to the discussion of divine revelation in connection with biblical scripture.
The healthiness of what I perceive to be Barth’s challenge to the mindset of biblical interpretation of his day was to confront the prevailing ‘wisdom’ of modernism that the only kind of truth that is ‘true’ is that which is discovered by ‘objective’, scientific and historical analysis. This mindset denied ‘faith’ as a valid way of understanding the world we live in, and biblical texts in particular. God was irrelevant. It was a ‘given’ of the modernist, enlightenment project that ‘objective’ means of enquiry were opposed to enquiries based on ‘faith’. Biblical texts therefore were the domain of the academy rather than the faith community. Modernism has itself gone on to give the lie to this assumption. The reality is that we approach everything with one kind of faith or another - science most of all - which has huge ‘faith’ in its methods and approaches.
Fallen reason & credo ut intelligam
Your post makes interesting reading, hungertruth. Let me respond to those sections which are mine. By fallen reason, Barth (and I agree with him) does not mean that we are unable to do good mathematics, science etc. His concern is the difference that results when the “object” of reasoning is God (or faith). God is not one item in a list of the furniture of the universe. Neither is God something akin to the Loch Ness Monster. Reflection upon God requires moral reasoning. Barth is alive to the clear evidence for the ways in which human reasoning in this area is subverted by conditioning, prejudice, hubris … “sin” is a good shorthand! That is why he fears the ever-present tendency to idolatry - at best to domesticate God and make God in our own image. It is another take on the work of Sheweitzer, who, you will recall, demonstrated so ably that each successive epoch recasts Jesus in its own image. I think that it would be difficult to dispute that reason plays a different role or has a different dynamic in this area. I think, too, that any responsible theology has to reckon with the deep-seated human resistance to God, demonstrated ultimately in the crucifixion of Jesus. Reason is not morally neutral when it comes to God.
A corollary is that belief is not a barrier to understanding or the proper exercise of reason, but its precondition. I would want to take seriously the constant refrain in the gospels, “Whoever has ears to hear, let them hear” (or eyes to see). There is such a thing as a wilful inability to understand. But for Barth, knowledge of God is not something “out there”, to be picked over as though God were a mountain or one of the wonders of the universe. It is possible only because of grace - the act of God’s self-disclosure. Barth is aware of the epistemological difficulties raised by the Enlightenment. He wants to assert that human beings are capable of genuine knowledge of God and faithful, reasoned reflection upon faith, but that this requires faith and conversion. I find it difficult to fault him!
Of course I have a faith
Of course I have a faith position, which is that God is dispersed within language. And I take the view that religion is somewhat like art, in terms of language games and methods of knowing or discerning. I take religion very seriously.
This statement of Paul is used today in a kind of isolation of proof text whereas I think Paul is making something more rounded and (relevant to conversation here) being somewhat cross cultural. After his death, the ambiguity about Jesus was effectively ended - Son of Man (here and now, cosmic coming in clouds of glory) messiah and so on and Jesus as dead either had to be the returning Messiah or it was nothing. The end of the world, the new reality, was still immanent. Now to be this Messiah, and to use the resurrection language that Paul did (though he was in a muddle - a spiritual body is like a square circle), means that Christ is the first of the resurrected. And Paul wraps this up with a soteriology of Adam, sin, and Christ crucified. Well a great many to whom he spoke had little understanding of the concept of the general resurrection and indeed many Jews rejected it when they did understand it (Pharisees believed it and Saduccees didn’t, for example).
So here we are - he is dead, and there is the big expectation still vital and strong, with plenty of charismatic religious experiences going on (as you do get in expectant sects - take say 1844 and all that) and the first of the resurrected is part of it. So Paul is saying abroad, if Christ is not resurrected then it’s all not happening. So the totality is made duff - the theology he developed, the expectation, the events to unfold, and his own religious experience and contact with Christian authority.
But we can say, hang on, the faith construction stands in its own right in terms of insights and as a package. The myth structure that was built up that Jesus operated within, and altered, and Paul in part operated within, and altered, is still pregnant with meaning. The difficulty is that culture has so changed that translation proves to be awkward to say the least.
What culture now? Well of course there are a plurality of them - but the generality is that the world will end when the sun becomes big and red, or we do it, otherwise nature is reasonably regular, and no God will intervene to stop this or that (didn’t bother with the holocaust), that we now have knowledge bases with their methods that are autonomous, and we do not live within the supernatural wonderland of even the Middle Ages. Explanations are in the here and now. And you notice this when in a church and people say all sorts of supernatural religious things and then go off into life and operate by entirely this worldly and practical methods.
Entering the world of pluralism
Pluralist - I’m assuming that by posting your various comments and responses on this website they are open to discussion, and that anyone, apart from those whom you are directly addressing, can comment on your points of view?
I’m quite interested in presuppositions, the things that underlie and inform the beliefs that people adopt. Hence a bit of discussion on the meaning of this word on this thread. Because many people assert that we are in a time of transition from one world view (modernism) to another (it’s called postmodernism, but that only indicates its somewhat parasitical attachment to the world view which preceded it), it has become possible to discern, and question, some of the prevailing assumptions which underpinned that world view.
This leads to an interesting issue, that whenever we assert something confidently to be ‘the truth’, what we are actually doing is making an assertion on the basis of a position which is actually reached by faith. If one can grasp the underlying elements which support the world view, we are in a better position to critique one world view against another.
There are a number of elements discernible in your own world view, as far as it is reflected in theological matters. The first was that God is a projection of the human mind, the product of how different cultures have tended to view him. God is no more than a human creation, contained within culture. This may be true, but in the end it destroys the case which it sets out to make. God, by definition, is not a construct of anything outside himself. It may be that God accommodates himself to human culture, thought-forms etc. But if he is no more than something within culture, he is purely a figment of our wishful thinking, and we can say whatever we like about him. The main thing is that he doesn’t exist, and one day a more enlightened culture will emerge which faces this honestly, and lives more honestly, to the betterment of everyone concerned. Just like our own culture … . ?
You take this a little further in your last post, by tantalisingly giving us a glimse of a (Derridean?) notion of ‘reality’ (and therefore God) being created, mediated and comprehended through language. At least that’s what I think you might have been suggesting. This locates you reassuringly in a comfortably up-to-date postmodern matrix.
To understand how a biblical world view relates to this sort of stance, we need to understand what sort of message is being mediated. I agree with you that proof texts of any kind are no way of proving a theological point. But what is clear from the biblical texts is that we have a narrative - built from the beginnings, through catastrophe and loss, to the puzzling choice of individuals and a nation to complete the purposes of a God who is both immersed in culture, yet stands outside it. Time and again, he calls individuals (and nations) to act counter-culturally: which is very far from from being a ‘projection’ of the cultures with which he is said to have dealings.
The point which emerges from this narrative is that, far from being ‘mythic’, the narrative deals with people through history. The history may not be history as we have decided to view it in the last 200 years or so; but history it nevertheless remains.
Then comes the astonishing and controversial entry into this historical narrative of Jesus of Nazareth. A figure who both identifies with the narrative and its expected outcomes, and who radically changes the narrative at key points. Your own interpretation of events at this point then reflects the ‘liberal’ theological viewpoint with which you have already identified yourself in an earlier post. Amongst other things, this assumes that events of a supposedly supernatural nature are ruled out, and the resurrection is explained away as a ‘reading back’ into the life of Jesus by his followers and the church at a later date. This is of course a ‘faith’ position, just as a belief in a historical resurrection from the dead of Jesus of Nazareth is a faith position. But you must realise that there is very little case to be made any longer for the sort of explanation you are putting forward. It has long been discredited. To put it succinctly, Bishop Wright has replaced Bishop Jenkins as Bishop of Durham.
But to return to the historical narrative of the bible, Paul was no more proof-texting in 1 Corinthians 15 than anyone else needs to. He was giving a credible explanation as to why a Jew such as himself, reflecting more the Pharisaical position of Shammai than Gamaliel, persecuting the church of which he became the foremost protagonist, should have undergone such a conversion. If Jesus was the messiah, the only way he could have retrieved any credibility following his crucifixion was through a resurrection from the dead. Grant that he rose from the dead, resurrection - not resuscitation, then things begin to fall into place. This was the essence of Paul’s Damascus road conversion.
It’s possible of course to interpret things in quite different ways. But the biblical narrative must be allowed to cast its own interpretation. It is narrative, and historic - not mythic. We must hear what it is saying, before we bring our own viewpoint to bear on it. The Christian faith ran into conflict with the two major cultures of its day - Judaism and the Roman Empire. Each had its own world view; each had its own God, or gods. Christianity not only brought these into question - it proclaimed their downfall in the face of the history of the one true God, whose narrative involvement in human history and culture it proclaimed to have reached its fulfilment and climax in Jesus of Nazareth.
This post may seem rather pedantically didactic, but it seems to me that there is so much that is unique about the Christian faith, just as there is so much that is unique about Christ, that it is simply impossible to syncretistically absorb it into other, culturally conditioned systems. In the end, this is a ‘faith’ statement. But I think we are in a position to compare and critique one person’s faith statement with another. It’s then up to us to decide which one sounds more authentic.
By the way, your website is very interesting and instructive, and I enjoyed the little sting in the tail of your last post!
A man of your times!
Pluralist, I have to say that I find your account of the development of the doctrine of resurrection and historical reconstruction unconvincing, because it is far too time-bound. It is understandable that someone living in the 21st century, under no threat, can explain everything in terms of myth, symbol, intra-textuality and language games. But historical reconstruction requires a deep engagement in the mindset of a different era, and from what we know, I find your account simply unlikely to the point of unbelievability. That isn’t the same thing as questioning your faith, I hasten to add! After all, it is the meaning of the resurrection that is important, and there is a Christian spectrum on the that ranges from the non-realist to the literalist. So let me try and clarify my questions.
(1) Where does the doctrine of the resurrection emerge from if it is only a theological construct? I know the biblical, theological and cultural etc matrix: but that is a post eventu answer. Faced with the doctrine, we are sent looking for its antecedents in the same way that Easter sends the evangelists back to the OT for prophetic references to a suffering messiah. Just as we cannot read those prophecies as though they were a coherent schema before Jesus, an attempt to use antecedents as a causal explanation for the doctrine’s emergence don’t cut the ice. It emerges from Easter and from Pentecost.
(2) If “resurrection” is a theolgical shorthand, and not bound to any analogous event, why pick on resurrection as the “language game” to be played? There are far less complicated and more coherent ways of making those points, isn’t there? This is important because resurrection cannot, on any account, be an intra-Christian textual metaphor. This is not apocalyptic imagery, understood only by the initiates. The resurrection of Jesus from the dead is unambiguous public discourse because it is the language of mission and evangelism. If it is “only” a theological construct, it needs far too much deconstruction to make sense to its first audiences. Whatever account you give of its emergence, you have to be able to account for its public success, seen in the rapid expansion of the earliest church.
(3) What about the reality of the lions? It is clear that the authorities who persecuted the Christains did so because they saw the preaching of the resurrection of Jesus as a threat. The gospels are clear evidence for the fact that there was a dispute about the disappearance of the body. The fact that the Romans, for example, could not produce the body of a convicted political agitator to refute claims that he was now alive again is significant. It means at least that they understood the “thological/symbolic/mythical” preaching to be the announcement that Jesus had survivied his death. Now, if that was not the case. why were the apostles prepared to die horribly for a misunderstanding, and have their friends and family die too? Why not explain the mistranslation between language games?
(4) If you (as the early church) choose the metaphor/symbol of resurrection, why pick on such an “embodied” concept when you mean something opposite? Why not go for the immortality of the soul or some culturally-conducive equivalent? Resurrection is a very “bodily” image. Paul uses it. Bodies were very important. There was no early worship at the tomb of Jesus - presumably because the body was not there! The gospel narratives are at pains to emphasise the risen Jesus as saying “I am not a ghost!” There was anxiety in the early community because they had understood Jesus to say that none of them would die before the Kingdom was fulfilled. Death. Life. Bodies. Why bother? Why pick on resurrection unless it was forced on you? Paul is very concerned about body matters. We know that he ought not to be read through calssical dualist spectacles. His body/spirit dualisms are not metaphysical. They refer to different ways of living embodied lives - embodied because of resurrection! So Paul continues to assert the spiritual significance of bodies. He is as earthy as they come - Gal 6 is an extended crude pun on chopping off foreskins! He uses sex as a metaphor for the relationship between Christ and the Church. Yet if you are right, the trajectory of Paul’s theology ought to be in precisely the opposite direction. Salvation would be understood as entirely other-wordly and a radically different form of reality. True spirituality would mean fleeing earth and body. Yet resurrection means that Paul is drawn towards earth and body, not away from it. Surely the most obvious reason is that he believed in the physical resurrection of Jesus from the dead?
I didn’t mean to go on at quite this length! I do not think that not believing in the physical resurrection of Jesus is faithless. It is the meaning that is important. But I find a great deal of your theology of resurrection deriving from what you think actually happened. At that point, the question of how compelling your reconstruction is comes into play, which is why I will be glad to see your response. I think that we have the luxury of a spectrum of opinion about what happened. I don’t think the earliest Christians did! I don’t think that your reconstructed view could have been held and operated by Paul or any of the apostles. That’s why I say you’re a man of your times and can’t argue this as a compelling historical reconstruction.
You're pretty certain about faith ...
For all that the resurrection is about faith, when the man Jesus died he died as anyone else does, and no cells and genes there were revived.
Is this a statement of faith (yours?) or of fact? If the latter, please tell on what basis? It will clear up millennia of debate and confusion. The texts clearly mythic? I would have said they are clearly theological. But I’m prepared to have my facts straightened out …
There are quite a number of
There are quite a number of points I am being asked about and I’ll answer in no particular order.
If we are talking about resurrection and not resuscitation, then no cells or genes were revived. We can discuss the theory of Jesus being taken healing herbs to the tomb, him not actually dying, that resuscitation was a sufficient miracle for anyone to go through (and indeed he was only on the cross for 6 hours, hardly long to suffocate) and later met his disciples, and, being on the boundary of the Roman Empire, cleared off as a wanted man and waited until the Kingdom came to come back.
This is a historical possibility. But the texts suggest to me that this did not happen, because for example he walks along with two who should but do not recognise him, and when he makes a theological point he is recognised, and then he disappears. Same when there is the meal - when recognised, he disappears. In other words, once they have seen the point, he’s gone. They are not strategy meetings for the future, but they are theological meanings about the then present (which was many tens of years later).
As for Paul and the maintaining the significance of bodies, well he has to doesn’t he because this is the language of himself and the communities. But it is a muddled language. There are people today who, after a bereavement, see their loved one at the end of the bed. They say it is more than a dream. But they tend not to use the language of bodies, because these days we have more the language of dreams and ghosts. If Paul is talking about a Messiah-Christ, he needs to talk that language. This is assuming he saw anything, and I don’t think he did. But that is my presupposition. Of course a lot of theology did go off into the gnostic direction, and you see a tug of war about that in both Paul and John. They both go towards the spiritual, and the evil of the world, and hold on to the bodily and good of the world. Some went gnostic, some stayed earthly.
As for the tomb, well let’s suppose Jesus was crucified and died. They Romans will have dumped the body in a rubbish pit. You cannot, years later, have an argument about the body and produce it as evidence. Of course there was an argument about the body, in that great Jewish figures were visited at their tombs. A messiah should have a tomb, where he is himself waiting to rise. But this messiah was already first of the resurrected. He is already busy, guiding, to reappear. We can imagine later communities asking questions about the body, and the stories that developed about that. So it is a later tradition (probably) and serves later questions - the evidence for this being the embellishment of the story as it goes on between gospels.
Whether I am ina time of threat or not, or they were or not, does not change the myth making nature of religion. The only difference is that, under threat, under oppression, myth making is faster and more intense, more wanting, and this is obviously happening there. There was continued expectation driving everything and continued oppression.
I can “hear” what it is saying, but I hear it indeed as a person who sees creative religion and myth building. There is an ethical gospel of reversals, which I think has historical base, and there is obviously charisma and response. But just because there is a simple explanation and a complicated explanation it does not mean that the simple explanation is the right one.
I hear all sorts of simple explanations, like I am the way I am because I am born with Aries, and this gives me characteristics. I then have to go through all sorts of explanations about planets and masses, the birth canal and conception, and the comparative mass of the midwife, and then get into long drawn out environmental and cultural influences as well as genetic influences. But people love simple explanations, especially supernatural ones. Well, the more complex one carries more explanatory weight, if you can be bothered.
My postmodernism is a little more complex because it allows degrees of realism in certain methodological situations, for example I can run a long way with primary sources for a realist approach to history, until of course we then say how that reality was created then, power relations, story making and that relativity at the heart of things. You pin something down and it disperses again.
So there was no resuscitation, a faith event happened as regards a community because it was happening and it was theologised all the way just as it has been even when Jesus the man was alive - he lived by his/ their myths too.
Oh and I don’t care much for Bishop Tom Wright and his line, but there we are, but then I thought Bishop David Jenkins was quite orthodox and even Barthian himself.
Thanks, Pluralist
Thanks for taking the time to respond so fully, Pluralist. That is quite a tour de force! If you have time to give this any further attention, I would be very interested to know what you think on the question of where the Christian language-game of resurrection arose, and why it was able to be so central to the kerygma (from which I take it to be a very public sort of discourse). That, I think, is the only point you didn’t touch on.
I’m with you on the value of compex explanatory models. And, as far as the cross, I tend more towards the dialectics of Moltmann than Tom Wright. One thing I want to clear up, and that is that resurrection is not resuscitation but recreation. I don’t puzzle too deeply about the physics and biology of it: I take it as the basis for Paul maintaining that to share in Christ’s death and resurrection is to become a kaine ktisis - a “new creation” (1 Cor 5:17).
Resuscitation - Resurrection
Actually I threw this one in myself, Lawrence; just to cover another angle. I don’t think there are any grounds for believing in resuscitation as an explanation of Jesus’s reappearance after his ‘death’; nor that his followers were hallucinating (why did the hallucinations suddenly stop c.40 days after his death? And would the disciples have faced death for a hallucination - or any other fraud?); nor that the body was disposed of; nor that a likeness of Christ was substituted for the real person on the cross (as Muslims believe). Does that cover all the usual alternative explanations to resurrection?
Is there a difference between profundity and complexity? I believe something profound happened in the death and resurrection of Jesus, and that the narrative is far from simple. But there is something very simple about humbling ourselves about our need of God, and recognising that in Jesus, his death, resurrection, ascension and outpoured Spirit, that need is met. Wasn’t it Tyndale’s ambition that every ploughboy in the land should be able to understand the bible in his own tongue - and not depend on someone else to interpret it for him?
Resurrection terminology
Well all these terms interlock and connect together; originally the might not but in the shifts that took place in early Christianity they did. Jesus himself (so far as we can tell) spoke about Son of Man, existing, coming and there is a puzzlement about titles and expectations, transformations and expected, even before he died. There is also a question about how much was semi-arranged to bring about death by Roman authorities to be God’s helper in bringing in the Kingdom (a sort of messianic Judaism Lenin!). Was he the messiah? Well, in a sense the “failure” of the death cleared up the issue - he had to be or nothing. The expectations were still there, the possibilities still there, and resurrection (general) was expected. He was the first. So that language is the one to describe profound charismatic experiences - not just Jews who were influenced by Jesus, but others too. As the figure of Jesus as Christ became the focus more and more, so resurrection became more singular and particular, and the explanation. But really it is something like this - that a growing community joining in the expectation is told yes you are having spiritual experiences, yes he was resurrected and seen, but he is now guiding you in a different way. So resurrection had to be a phenomenon that started and indeed ended - thus “the” resurrection. So we have the helper of the Holy Spirit, Christ in the Church, the leadership properly appointed (the people who saw Jesus, the people are told, are a leadership roll-call - the 500 being the congregation after all the leaders.
With this faith spirit driven there is a huge dynamic to it, and it escaped (in part) the destruction of the Romans that affected so many Jewish movements. Many fizzled also with the disappointment, but the Jesus movement was able to adapt from the disappointment of no end. It did so geographically, ethnically and by diversity of message, and only later was it brought into a more coherent whole with exclusions and decisions about authoritative texts now to be used for all time.
Well, this is one explanation.
Resurrection as 'reading back' from later spiritual experiences
Didn’t the spiritual experiences occur after the resurrection sightings? Before that, the disciples seemed to have given up, gone back to their former occupations - just one more failed messiah. The Emmaus road account falls into this category. It wasn’t as if they were developing some sort of religious mania, (or depressive psychosis) which erupted into claimed sightings. It was after the claimed sightings that some sort of regathering and expectation seems to have arisen.
The mention of the resurrection appearances to 500 people at the same time contains a crucial sub-clause: many of those to whom Jesus appeared, Paul says, were still alive at the time of writing. In other words, they could have been cross-questioned as witnesses. They must have been pretty rock solid witnesses to be relied on so confidently.
The sudden cessation of appearances is also noteworthy. Why didn’t the disciples go on claiming that they were having resurrection sightings and experiences? Why not perpetuate this to the present day? Make it into a test of spirituality - and qualification for climbing the hierarchy? A very good way of ensuring religious control, as well as attracting attention.
The idea of the church fabricating a resurrection mythology at a later stage (and I’m assuming Pluralist means that this mythology is not promoted as mythology, but dressed up as history) depends on sufficient distance in time from the events so described to make them less susceptible to investigation. But many would have been alive at the time the events occurred (death of Christ, resurrection, Pentecost etc) when the accounts started to circulate in the form we now have them. The charge of a mythologising conspiracy would have been the obvious and easiest one to make by Jews and Romans. Why was such a charge never made?
The issue of Jesus’s kingdom statements and prophecies is clearly very important - and has been the basis of discussion on this site. It’s also, as you probably are aware, the basis of Tom Wright’s redevelopment of the quest for the historical Jesus. But it’s not as if it poses issues on which the credibility of Jesus or the Christian faith stands or falls. It’s just that there is a lot of discussion as to what he meant in some of his statements.
If I were setting out to develop a resurrection mythology on the basis of disappointed expectations and suppressed religious mania, I could think of far better ways of doing it than we have in the gospels. It’s not that you don’t have a case to make, Pluralist, it’s just that I don’t think it stacks up very well.
Conceptual misleads
I think we have a far sharper subject orientated view of history that ancoent peoples for whom story and history are rather more mixed up. We are aware of the limitations of history, and history as a form of methodology.
That said, I expect the people at the time to have been full of spiritual experiences of all kinds and there was not just the dedicated team Jesus took with him but a number of followers and expectant around him and them. They will have needed catering for.
It is often said that the disciples ran away, inferring despair and that’s it, and all over. Then bingo, something happened, and the engine started up again. Well this cannot be so. Jesus either was aware that his life was up, or even arranged it (through the good offices of Judas), and if he spoke of resurrection then there was expectation of a coming end that included events coming. He is in Gethsemane (I don’t want to get too historical - our sense) wishing he did not have to do this, to be the human motivator and God’s suffering servant to bring God to do the final act and bring in the Kingdom. So it was not as if this was the end was it? All the time his charismatic, healing and directing power would have adjusted to the provocative situation of the move to the wealth and power of Jerusalem.
It is not fabrication here, but rather adjusted (and very adjusted) rereading of what went on. They were very commited and purposeful, if fearful and on a knife’s edge of their understanding of history working itself out. Paul’s theology also of last days but of a much more cosmic Christ has been the spark towards considerable re-reading, towards eventually all the credal stuff.
People now want to prove, as if in a bottle, that somethign scientific called resurrection took place. But even if something did, it is the wrong way around. Here is an example. The Bab, or Gate, of the Babi faith (later Bahai) was put up against a wall, the troops took aim and he was shot. When the smoke cleared he was still alive, and impossibly they had missed, and he was brought back to be shot again, and this time they killed him. Some Bahais think this a miracle that proved a point. But even if it did, does it introduce the requirement to take on the Bahai faith? It is the same with the resurrection. It is faith that leads to resurrection, not resurrection that leads to faith. It was never a faith-prover, but a language of explanation amongst much else. And we cannot impose upon it what we would like it to be, except as another story.
The other way round
People now want to prove, as if in a bottle, that somethign scientific called resurrection took place.
I am aware of the different criteria for ancient views of history. I am also very aware of the extent to which history in the bible is theologised. What I am reluctant to do, however, is to assume too readily that ancient peoples like the Hebrews, whose theology is distinct in that it is a theology of history, originating not primarily in the world of mythological narratives, cyclical views of history etc, are unsophisticated in the way you seem to suggest, Pluralist. Part of that is a rigorous discernment of testimony. Whatever else is going on - and there is a great deal of it! - we have to reckon with the fact that the earliest preachers saw themselves as “witnesses”. They testified to what they had seen. And they put their testimony up for public scrutiny. I simply find it incredible that there can be no necessary link between event, experience and “language game” when it comes to resurrection in the way you suggest.
What I find more credible about your argument on this point is that a 21st century theologican is asked to contruct a theoretical explanation for the emergence of the resurrection in the NT, despite the fact that nothing “happened” to Jesus after his death, in which failure and finality is, by linguistic-theological manipulation, transformed into its opposite. Your argument sounds as though people today are less concerned to “prove” that the resurrection did take place than that it didn’tt!
Let's Amputate Faith Altogether!
Although this discussion has taken a turn in order to look at the historicity of the N.T. and the resurrection in particular, I want to ask a few questions and make a few comments based on some of the phrases and concepts mentioned since my last post.
Peter mentioned ‘faith presuppositons,’ ‘faith positions,’ and ‘faith statements’ earlier and I am still curious why the word ‘faith’ is necessary. The word just seems to confuse things. I would like to present a modest proposal that we remove that word from our vocabulary and replace it with a synonym depending on context. It seems that there are so many different definitions and it is used in so many different ways without specification, equivocation is almost inevitable.
Later on Peter mentions Barth wanting faith to be a valid way of understanding the world we live in. Again I want to know what this means? Blindly accepting a book as a source of information or truth about the world? Taking a stab in the dark with some sort of mystical conversion and then hope to be able to have faithful and reasoned reflection? What would be the point of faithful and reasoned reflection after an initial un-critical leap/faith conversion?
Lawrence defends Barth rejecting God as on “object” to be known by reason. If we don’t use our reason to interpret the information we have at our disposal, then what other means do we have of knowing that God exists and secondly, that he/she/it is worthy of honor/worship? Why would we assume that reflection on God is a moral endeavor? What is moral reasoning anyway?
It was categorically stated, “reason is not morally neutral when it comes to God.” I would think that this differs radically person-to-person and is conditioned upon what a particular person conceives when they think of the word, ‘God’. If little Johnny thinks that ‘God’ is something that takes pleasure in torturing little kids for all eternity who have sneaked a cookie out of the jar without permission, then who can fault him for not wanting such a God to exist. If he found out that such a God existed, who would fault him for wanting to fight this God rather than cowardly submitting to such an evil, wicked being.
Lastly, I want to comment on Pluralists claim that, “faith leads to resurrection, not resurrection that leads to faith”. Are you referring to the gospel accounts, or generalizing about modern men? I think it is evident that the resurrection stories and sightings lead to belief that Jesus was alive again, especially doubting Thomas who was not content with eyewitness testimony. As for people today, I think if you are generalizing, you are accurate, but there are those who actually become convinced by assessing the evidence. I think Josh McDowell or Lee Strobel would be a case in point.
I am eager to hear all of your thoughts on these matters.
Faith, morality, reason and the knowledge of God
Barth was ahead of his time. He came to distrust reason as objective and leading to true knowlege of the true God because he saw his teachers support first the Kaiser and then Hitler. The world’s greatest Christian scholars - experts in God-talk and study - had so failed to understand God that they found support for German militarism not only compatible with Christian faith but a Christian duty. It is precisely the notion of the disinterested objectivity of reason, inherited from pre-Christian classical philosophy, that has been shown up to be a myth by the Sociology of Knowledge. That is true not only of the humanities, but of science too (some very interesting work has been done by sociologists who have infiltrated laboratories. Try and get hold of Laboratory Life - author escapes me).
The question that arises is what clouds the objectivity of reason. Social conditioning is a major factor. But so are things that have to do morality. Prejudice, racism, sexism, homophobia etc are all instances of drives that exercise enormous shaping power over the exercise of reason. Why, for instance, did it take so long to realise that slavery was wrong? Or the equality of the sexes? These sorts of blind spots are well known. The point is that we look in the wrong places for their persistence if we see them primarily as “reason gone wrong”. When our “understanding” about these things changes, the shift is seismic. We call them “paradigm shifts”. They are, if you like, conversion experiences. But they are fundamentally moral shifts, at least as much as they are cognitive shifts. The two go hand in hand. So, for example, we see the Confessing Church (of which Barth was a part) not so much as the presence of reason in the midst of unreason but of moral courage and Christian faith.
There is a further angle to this. Barth believed in the necessity of the exercise of reason. He was absolutely rigorous in his theology. But theology for him is critical reflection upon faith, not upon God. God is a “given” of faith. Our first response to God is not thought but joyful commitment. Theology is critical reflection upon what faith believes God to be. And how do we come to that faith in who God is? Not by reason (Barth abhored natural theology because he saw it as the inevitable creation of idols) but by God’s gracious self-disclosure, supremely in Jesus. That is why Barth is a theologian - the modern theologian - of revelation. We could know nothing of God unless God chooses to make God’s self known. The “infinite qualitative difference” between God and God’s creation means that we creatures can only know God through God’s self-disclosure. God is Mystery, not an object in the world’s furniture that can be scrutinised and analysed.
For Barth, knowledge of God is not something gained through something akin to scientific discovery. The closest analogy is the knowledge we have of other people - a knowledge gained through relationship. That relationship is the gift of faith. It is what Buber calls an I-Thou relationship rather than an I-It relationship. So faith and conversion makes possible the hitherto unrealisable possibility: genuine knowledge of God.
Barth has been accused of the sort of fideism you appear to deplore, but he is in a very, very different place. He is a child of the post-Enlightenment. He accepts that the only type of knowledge that human beings can have is human knowledge. Revelation is not about a series of propositions - facts - as though God gives us supernatural knowledge of the world. Revelation is God’s self-disclosure, so that what we “see” with the eye of faith is that the world and all reality is God-infused. He is quite clear that it is totally “reasonable” to interpret the world as godless. That is why, for him, God is never the goal or the achievement of human reason, but faith’s presupposition. It is the a priori we can never get behind to establish upon even more fundamental criteria.
So Barth is absolutely with your little Johnny in his opposition to the type of god Johnny understands God to be. That God is an idol and needs to be resisted - to the point of death, if need be!
Barth can never be accused of being a fundamentalist! He would have no time for the kind of reasoning that we see in Josh McDowell. McDowell’s problem is that he takes the texts at face value. His reasoning on Jesus as “Lord, Liar or Lunatic?” for example cannot be faulted if you take an uncritical view of the texts McDowell uses. But once you grant that John (on whom McDowell bases his christology) is presenting a radically theologised gospel account, his case unravels. It is impossible to take the text seriously and assume, for example, that Jesus’ statement in John’s gospel: “Before Abraham was, I AM” is a straightforward reporting of the actual words of Jesus. Barth sees the biblical texts as bearing faithful witness to God’s self-disclosure, but not as God’s self-disclosure per se. That distinction belongs only to Jesus who is God incarnate and therefore unambiguously the Word of God.
Whether or not you agree with Barth (and I am certainly with him on these matters), I hope that I’ve at least clarified what I was saying.
Faith for me is a shorthand
Faith for me is a shorthand for commitment, direction, disposition; so that faith in God is not about faith in the existence of something but faith in the purpose and value of something because it is commitment, direction, disposition.
About >doubting Thomas who was not content with eyewitness testimony<. I read this passage like everyone else, but I don’t see a video camera shot scene, or journalist’s notes about this bloke who doubted it and the one to whom it happened said well let’s look at the evidence. It says clearly to me and the readers it was intended for that it is better to have faith and all that involves than be sidelined looking for the evidence. They had no evidence then, the communities being taught about the resurrection having begun. Remember this Jesus Christ resurrected was supposed to be a spirit-body anyway, something that could go through doors and was written as disappearing once they got the theological point. So such a transformation was hardly going to convince someone unless he was the real flesh and blood bloke saying have a look at my unhealed wounds, mate. Well this is another theological point being made to readers. What’s the evidence? Faith is the evidence, should be the evidence, better evidence.
>They testified to what they
>They testified to what they had seen. And they put their testimony up for public scrutiny.<
No - they testified to what they knew. It is like what comes through our eyes, but what we see is based on what we know. So events are a combination of constructions readily in our heads as well as what comes through our eyes (to consider one of the senses). Indeed it can even be further than this, that what we know even produces what comes through our eyes, particularly regarding art and religious experience. People say we join the dots in our heads, but someone else will say what dots? Instead of this faith first approach, people continue to try to isolate and out into the test tube something called resurrection, at some base point, whereas I am saying it is a complex of interpretations based on what was at hand as well as changes to account for the situations they were in. No genes were involved, no transformed genes were involved, nor (I maintain) is this the right place to look.
Submission versus Reason
Thank you for your thought provoking article "Is Evangelical Christianity and Longer Credible?". Although I support your approach, I also maintain that it is not compatible with Christian thought and Christian tradition.
An implicit assumption of your article is that man can determine the truth about the universe through persistent inquiry alone. Belief in the power of human rationality is a key element of Hellenic thought. In contrast, pre-Hellenic Judaism regards God as surpassing man’s comprehension: God makes himself known through revelation, not through reason. Man relationship with God was thus one of unquestioning submission (ie. Abraham’s readiness to sacrifice) .
Christianity is the child of these two incompatible world views, which remain in constant tension. Perhaps then, the way to honour both of Christianity’s heritages would be to affirm the importance of the deconstruction project, while also conceding its ultimate lack of viability..