Critical-realism and postmodernism

The ‘emerging church’ project is an experiment in new forms of church. The question of what ‘church’ is, however, cannot be resolved sociologically or experimentally. Ultimately, a theological answer is required. This page was written to provide some preliminary reflection for the Future of the People of God conference with Tom Wright. It is an attempt to address some of the more theoretical questions that arise when Wright’s retelling of the story of Jesus, constructed on the basis of a critical-realist hermeneutic, is considered from a postmodern perspective.

Why do we need a new story about Jesus and the church?

Raison d’être

Modernism, through a rigorously applied rationality, has undermined the irrational grounds for faith (tradition, emotion, sentimentality, superstition). Postmodernism, through a rigorously applied irrationality, has undermined the rational grounds for faith (arguments for the truth of Scripture or the existence of God). The church, as a result, has been left without a compelling reason to exist. Recent decades have seen an increasingly urgent process of reinvention as the church has struggled to find a workable identity in a post-Christian age. The danger, now, is that ‘emerging church’ will simply prove to be one more frantic rearrangement of the deckchairs before the ship sinks for good. It is essential, therefore, that we find a way to tell the story, not least to ourselves, that will sustain – indeed, that will necessitate – the continuing presence of the church in the world.

Renewal of the mind

The church has sought to renew itself in a number of different and largely discrete areas. It has undergone structural reorganization through the rise of lay ministry and the house and cell church movements. It has been renewed emotionally and spiritually through the charismatic movement. There has been a renewal of worship, first through the introduction of popular music forms, secondly through the rise of alternative worship and a recovery of older forms. There has been a drive to regain relevance through social and political engagement. To some extent the missionary imperative has been restored through the seeker church movement and the Alpha course. All these developments, however, have been jeopardized by a persistent problem of credibility: do we really feel that we have a good enough reason for doing this at all?

The need, therefore, is for an equivalent renewal of the mind – not as a new enthusiasm for dogmatic formulations of Christian truth but as the recovery of a basic critical intelligence and integrity. We have not dared to tamper with the core intellectual structures of evangelical faith (by which I mean a faith that is prepared to proclaim the same good news that Jesus taught) probably because we are afraid that the whole edifice will collapse on us if we do. The postmodernization of evangelicalism has gone some way in this direction because postmodernism is fundamentally a critique of ways of thinking; but it has for the most part stopped short of a serious reconsideration of the biblical foundations of faith. Central to the renewal of thought must be a new understanding of, and a new confidence in, the biblical texts. Only on this basis will it be possible to challenge the deep-seated paganism of Western culture.

Reintegration of the parts

The aim then will be to re-integrate these different areas of renewal around a reconstructed intellectual core. One of the real dangers of the postmodernization of evangelicalism is that it remains a rather narrow and esoteric interest. But in principle postmodernism, with its preference for organic, networked systems, ought to engender a more holistic and comprehensive approach to the life of faith.

What are the principles of thought and interpretation that will shape the telling of this new story?

Historical narrative is the basis for Christian self-understanding

There is both a diachronic and a synchronic dimension to the development of a theology for the emerging church. The argument has for the most part been developed synchronically, or a-historically, in response to cultural and intellectual changes taking place both inside and outside the church. Biblical stories are treated as types and exemplars of general spiritual truths. The diachronic or historical dimension has been neglected. We do not understand well enough the historical-eschatological narrative that brings us to the point at which we may properly address the postmodern questions about identity, community, mission, truth, culture, and so on.

The task of explicating the story is not exempt from normal standards of rationality

The story never becomes ‘true’ apart from the act of reading, interpreting and telling. This is not an epistemologically privileged process. It cannot be argued, for example, that the truthfulness of any particular telling of the story is vouchsafed by dogmatic tradition or by the activity of the Spirit. There must in principle be a willingness to subject the biblical texts to critical investigation and to accept, even if only provisionally, the results of that investigation.

Narrative must be contextualized

Abstract timeless truths need to be placed back in a narrative landscape. It is important that this landscape be determined historically because otherwise it is likely that the abstraction will be allowed to define the story: much postmodern Christian story-telling is merely an allegorization of the timeless truths. The historical-critical method is the only means we have of ensuring the production of an authentic and persuasive narrative and therefore, in the long run, of establishing viable grounds for mission.

A contextualized story is a story among others

From the inside the Christian story has always functioned as a meta-narrative that must assimilate and qualify all other stories, whether religious, scientific, political or philosophical. A church that is developing a postmodern mentality will probably have to let go of this presumption and find more modest ways of maintaining an allegiance to it in a pluralistic culture. We will need to learn more interactive, less combative, modes of engagement.

As interpreters we have chosen this story from among others as a matter of evangelical commitment

The narrative that emerges must retain its power to motivate worship, ministry and mission. The critical-realist approach is not intended to rationalize spiritual realities or demythologize a primitive belief system. It remains precisely an attempt to recover the religious and historical force of the events that unfolded at the end of the age, the personality of the protagonists in Israel’s end-game.

What is the core narrative?

There can be no definitive summary of the core narrative, but it will run something like this (cf. ‘The kingdom of God’):

At the heart of the narrative is not the universalized theme of the Son of God becoming man and dying for my sins but a complex national story about a decisive eschatological transition in the identity of the people of God. Israel under Roman occupation was still in exile and still under judgment for its sins. Jesus announced an imminent return from exile, a restoration of the people of God, and the reinstatement of God as king in Zion.

Restoration, however, would not be easy: narrow is the path that leads to life. First, Israel as a political-religious entity would not escape concrete and catastrophic judgment for its hardness of heart. Those who survived – or were saved from – the disaster would do so only because they had, to use Paul’s terminology, ‘died with Christ’, who had suffered that judgment in their place. Secondly, a restored people, driven by the Spirit of God out from Jerusalem into the pagan world, would inevitably encounter opposition. At the heart of the eschatological promise to Jesus’ followers, therefore, is the assurance that the ‘beast’ would not prevail over the saints of the Most High, represented in Daniel’s crucial vision by a figure in human form: the pagan empire would be overthrown and the ‘kingdom’ would be given to the ‘one like a son of man’. Not even death was powerful enough to separate the saints from the love of God, any more than it had separated Jesus from his Father in heaven.

The community that survived the period of crisis would be marked by: i) an acknowledgement of Jesus as the one to whom the kingdom had been given; ii) the experience of Spirit, which is the life of the age to come; iii) a calling to be a blessing to the nations; and iv) a commitment to incorporate others into the people of God.

How does the reassertion of such a core narrative relate to the postmodern critique of the traditional evangelical method?

(This section overlaps with an earlier posting, ‘Postmodernism and the Jesus of History’.)

The development and implementation of a critical-realist hermeneutic and the postmodernization of evangelical theology are two distinct tasks. In certain respects they may even be seen as incompatible tasks: while postmodernism arises from a profound loss of confidence in human knowing, critical-realism aims to recover more reliable knowledge about – or a more reliable way of speaking about – a subject.

David Clines has some good things to say about the implications of postmodernism for biblical studies in an article called ‘The Pyramid and the Net’. The whole article is worth reading, but the following paragraph is enough to illustrate the tension between modern and postmodern approaches to the text:

If the modern is interested in what texts say, the postmodern is interested in what texts do not say. It is their silences, their repressions, their unexpressed interests, the social, religious and political ambitions that they screen from us, that we are concerned with in a postmodern age. We do not discount the project of exegesis; we might even sometimes, though not on principle, regard it as foundational. But it is the point of departure for more grown up questions about texts, for questions that go beyond mere meaning. The trouble with meaning as the goal for the study of texts is that it restricts the scholar to recapitulating the message of the text. You do not find scholars of a ‘modern’ persuasion saying, This is what my text means, and personally I do not believe a word of it. Mostly they think their job is done when they have said again, in their own words, what their text has already said. But in my opinion, any scholar who has ambitions of being a real human being cannot let it go at that, but has to involve herself or himself with the text, and not take refuge in critical distance (however necessary critical distance might be as a heuristic device). At the very least, the critic in a postmodern age will need to be asking, What does this text do to me if I read it? What ethical responsibility do I carry if I go on helping this text to stay alive?

Nevertheless, I think there are a number of ways in which we might establish a more constructive interaction between these two processes.

1. Both critical-realism and emerging church have developed, to some degree, as reactions against what is perceived to be a certain inaccuracy or inauthenticity within traditional evangelicalism with regard to its intellectual substructure and share a similar critique of it.

2. The current crisis of confidence and the growing willingness (born largely from desperation) to experiment with new forms of church have created the sort of opening needed to channel a more realistic understanding of Jesus, of his mission, and of the nature and purpose of the church into the mainstream. There appears to be a large group of believers who are open to new ways of thinking and willing to explore a new discourse of faith.

What is needed is a usable, public hermeneutic that does not merely serve the interests of an unthinking pre-emptive dogmatism. The challenge here is in the words ‘usable’ and ‘public’. Such a hermeneutic must be consistent with the standards and methods of ordinary rationality, which is likely to reflect an oscillation, rather than a conflict, between modern and postmodern habits of thought, and must be allowed to shape popular, and not merely scholarly, Christian discourse. To put it in Wright’s terms, the portrait of Jesus that is emerging from ‘Third Quest’ scholarship needs to have an impact at ‘pew-level’ and at ‘street-level’ (Who was Jesus?, 16).

3. An historically oriented hermeneutic presents what is probably the most effective means of deconstructing the controlling paradigms of modern evangelical interpretation while, at the same time, offering the possibility of re-constructing an alternative narrative coherent and powerful enough to motivate a recognizably ‘evangelical’ commitment and hope.

4. A critical-realist hermeneutic gives priority to the historical and theological referents behind the text. In that sense it is pragmatic. In this way we may hope to avoid both the modern preoccupation with abstracted propositional truth and the postmodern distrust of the texts and of the project of exegesis.

A critical-realist hermeneutic is the product not of church practice and teaching but of scholarly investigation. This has certain advantages. One is that we may hope to reduce the gulf that has opened up between biblical scholarship and the thought-world of the church. Another is that it will allow for a more tentative, open-minded management of the truth. We come much closer to the standpoint of postmodernism if we recognize that truth is always an emergent value and cannot be separated from the complex, unpredictable process of coming to understand.

5. Both critical-realism and postmodernism encourage a heightened interpretive self-consciousness, a stronger awareness of the difficult nature of the relation between reader and text. The Bible does not constitute an inert, unambiguous body of truth: it is complex, intricately related both to its own world and to the world of the reader, inescapably subject to interpretation. While critical-realism is always at risk of falling back into positivism, on the other side of postmodernism it becomes the means by which we take the reader’s engagement with the text with the utmost seriousness because it accepts the possiblity of finding truth again.

6. On the face of it, Wright’s insistence on the historicality of the gospel narratives runs counter to the postmodern distrust of purported historical knowledge, but it may be in its particularity that the story about Jesus finds its plausibility within the framework of a more suspicious epistemology. The history of dogmatic interpretation has always moved from the particular and concrete to the abstract and universal and has then re-imagined the historical starting point in universal terms. Postmodernism resists the dogmatic argument, but it may be possible to return to a more confidently reconstructed historical narrative and restate its inherent truthfulness in a way that does not ignore the limitations and difficulties of historiography. Biblical theology arose originally out of concrete, particular, historical narratives. The convergence of Third Quest and postmodernism allows, and requires us, to repeat that process.

7. If the critical-realist investigation of Jesus can be developed towards the idea of a post-eschatological church, there is a huge potential for constructing a highly integrated programme and spirituality for the church. In The Meaning of Jesus (208-225) Wright argues, on the basis of a critical-realist retelling of the story of Jesus, for an integration of four areas of Christian experience: spirituality, theology, politics and healing. This sort of ‘holistic’ approach sits well with the postmodern aversion to dualism (cf. N.T. Wright, New Tasks for a Renewed Church, 7-8).

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a thought on critical realism its usefulness

I have believed for as long as I have thought about theology that the use of critical realism is based on a confusion. But, in general terms, Christian theologians will find themselves unsuccessful arguing against this position and its use in theology-science discourse, philosophical theology and biblical apologetics. It is assumed that if you not some kind of critical realist (I realise this is a wide term), then you must, therefore, be an antirealist (that God, for example, is nought more than an imaginative construction). The problem with critical realism is that the tension it sets out to resolve (how we know objects at-a-distance from ourselves, as subjects) is based on a misconception. We have retained an anxiety that began in the work of Rene Descartes – the idea of the human mind or the self as an inner room that is totally private and no-one else can enter. After all, no of know what it is like to be anyone else. For Augustine (the original root of this idea), this room of the self was likened to a courtyard where one could encounter sunlight from above. But for Descartes and then the Englishman John Locke, this room was one with a roof and no windows! We no longer even get to look out of the window and actually see the outside world, but only its image projected onto the inner wall of our dark room through the shafts of light of reason. Hence we are all certain of what is inside our own minds (‘I am a thinking thing’) and insecure about all else. This insecurity is what critical realism feasts upon. So to overcome it we render a dichotomy: a veil of language (faulty, incomplete) and a realm of ideas (true, complete) to deal with not-quite-knowing if anything really exists or matters. The problem with this is that language might not adequately represent what is ‘out there’ and so we all become sceptics about language and its capacity to represent reality. This is often described as a key part of (particularly French) postmodernism – it needn’t be, as with much about postmodernism the key problem lies in Modernism and our hangover from it.

The image at work in realism is of a knower looking at the world, but the real world is draped in language (which is bad, apparently). A critical realist believes that language is arbitrarily semi-transparent (that we get glimpses of the world in our words). However, one has to consider the chance that language is not transparent at all, in which case one has no way of knowing if there is a world at all. This is the point at which one could be accused of being anti-realist.

However, to remedy this predicament more philosophy is helpful. Let us assume three things (for arguments sake):

1.One cannot speak meaningfully about language if one assumes it is externally related to the world (that there are no words in the world). Language and the world are internally related (see 3., below).

2.That is to say that neither language nor world is conceivable by humans prior to, or independently of, the other.

3.’Language-users’ (humans, Christians even!) are not spectators of the world, but participants in it. They can’t be in it without effecting it by their presence.

So whilst we cannot know the world outside of our human, linguistically-shaped experience of it, this is not a bad thing. We should not desire such non-human knowledge; this is to move toward desiring the status of God (a literal view, as things are and will be) and we should avoid such cravings. The problem, therefore, with critical realism in theology is it use of visual metaphors that entail the passivity of the knower (you and me). Can we know that the Sermon on the Mount is an exemplary set of social teachings? Yes, but only by going out and practicing the directions of the preacher – there are good instructions and bad instructions and practice helps us tell the difference, discussion in abstract does not. A similar response could be assembled for the mess known as historical Jesus studies. Can we know that a man called Christ really existed and said and did all the things that were claimed about him? Not by any measure critical realism offers (visually, evidence is always flawed and open to mixed interpretation, as Geza Vermes and Tom Wright show in their radically differing conclusions). However, Christ himself offers us a way of knowing him and understanding the truthfulness of his teachings in life and death: Change the central influence of your life to Christ. Read and inwardly digest the scriptures. Ask yourself: are you making them come alive or is the Spirit in the text making you? I hope the latter. Live it, practice it and die doing it. In this action will we all discover the presence of Christ in healthy, holy places and people: after all, the One who ascended is now alive in each one of us not caged in documentation or in Eucharistic elements – shouldn’t this be our stimulus to faith, an embodied relationship, not a just matter of history ‘proving’ Jesus true or false?

Andrew said: "Modernism, t

Andrew said:

Modernism, through a rigorously applied rationality, has undermined the irrational grounds for faith (tradition, emotion, sentimentality, superstition). Postmodernism, through a rigorously applied irrationality, has undermined the rational grounds for faith (arguments for the truth of Scripture or the existence of God). The church, as a result, has been left without a compelling reason to exist.”

One thing we need to take into account is that postmodernism has also undermined the rational grounds for scientific realism. Indeed in appears to me that it has eliminated any grounds to believe that science has any Epistomological merit.

The idea of being able to know anything by utilizing any philosophical or scientific methodology is being thoroughly discredited. Most people are very uncomfortable with the inability to know anything. It frightens. It attacks mankind’s inherent pride. It is disturbing.

It need not be disturbing because it is not necessary to know anything.
What is necessary, however, is that we do something.

How do we then know what to do if we don’t know anything? Well, to do something we must make a decision. All decisions are based on incomplete data. Most decisions are based on insufficient data and instinct. We all do this all the time, mostly without realizing it.

What is data? Data are the simply sense impulses we experience. From a purely sceptical, post-modernist view point these sense impulses are not knowledge. True, but these sense impulses are the best information available.

We make decisions and take actions based on this insufficient data.

The true post-modern question is how can we analyze the data to make the best decisions we can.

Science’s truth claims seem to simplify down to the statement “Science works, it has to be true.” This is not an adequate proof for many reasons. But it can be said “Science treats sense data in such a way as to allow one to make many good decisions.”

I would dispute that Science is the best method for making all decisions, but it has a good track record in physics, chemistry and the physical aspects of medicine.

What science is inadequate to address is how to make moral decisions. Religion and Philosophy have a much better track record there.

I will not go into into the methodology needed to select between religous and moral alternatives. What I want to point out is that Christians can and should use post-modernism to debunk the truth claims of science and materialism in the same way that modernists undermined the rational grounds for faith.

We do not need to pretend that God has provided us with provable objective knowlege regarding our world. The truth claims of scripture are not of that nature. Jesus said “You shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free.” but he also said “I am the way and the truth and the life, no one comes to the father except by me”

Truth does not lie in objective provable facts. Truth lies in a person and a relationship with that person.

As long as the popular myth that “Science can prove things, religion cannot.” is prevalent, Materialists will use Occam’s razor to cut away at the credibility of faith.

The way to overcome the materialist’s arguments is not by trying to go back to the modernist argumemts for the truth of Christianity. The way to overcome the materialist viewpoint is to conceed the point that “God cannot be proved” and argue the point that “Science has no rational basis for truth claims.”

From there we can proceed to show that the evidence supporting the decision to believe in Christ is better than the evidence otherwise.

Note: I am a 47 yr old civil engineer with no formal philosophical or theological training. I read up on this kind of stuff as a hobby. I’m am an amateur (I do it for the love of the activity). I realize that there are major gaps in my understanding. If I am way off base on something please don’t flame me. Please point me in a direction that will help me to fill the gaps.

Certainty, belief and 'knowing'

There is an interesting connection between this thread and the certainty/evidence/proof conversation taking place elsewhere on the website.

The comments in response to Andrew’s initial post seem to have moved away from his main points - which I take to be the need for a better basis in theological practice to underpin a better way of being the church. The discussion has both theoretical and practical interests.

With regard to the modern/post modern discussion: I wonder whether we may need to explore the possibility that modernism and post modernism have a continuing co-existence, albeit as uneasy bedfellows. Our tendency is to assume that the one will replace or supersede the other. I’m not sure it works like that - especially as post modernism is more a critique of modernism than a stable self-supporting philosophical position in itself.

The reformulating of historical theology by Tom Wright relies heavily on the ‘modern’ insights and methodology of historical criticism. The narrative framework he provides as a perspective on the historical Jesus is being taken as a key to a ‘post modern’ theology - as outlined by Andrew above.

In this process, critical realism is a friend rather than enemy (as implied by Ric above) of biblical understanding.

The discussion on ‘knowledge’ and ‘knowing’ uncannily echoes the discussion on evidence and certainty taking place elsewhere on the site. Somehow we are constantly being jostled towards one of two extremes: either we can (philosophically) have no basis for certainty in knowledge about anything, or (theologically) we feel (perhaps with some underlying panic) there must be some things which are taken as dogmatically certain, otherwise we have no firm basis for belief in anything.

In the discussion taking place elsewhere, it feels as if this kind of polarisation is diminishing useful and productive thinking. The historicity of the resurrection, for instance, is a ‘given’ as far as Christianity is concerned - even though nothing (not even the resurrection) can be historically proved with absolute certainty. But in everyday life, we don’t approach ‘certainty’ quite like that - we acccept things on the basis of all the data which is available. In this case, the data is pretty unassailable.

In the current modern/post modern dialogue, philosophy shows an undesirable tendency to assume that its most recent insights invalidate all previous insights - as if there were some evolutionary process whereby more ‘primitive’ thinking merely provided steps on the way to the most up-to-date thinking, and that ‘primitive’ thinking can be discarded as a kind of ‘vestigial’ organ in the human body - an unnecessary relic of a by-gone era.

(This ‘evolutionary’ approach to thinking is itself very ‘modern’, and pressed to its limits undermines the usefulness of biblical studies itself as a basis for contemporary belief and living).

In the same way, we can assume that the insights of ‘modernism’ must now give way ever increasingly to the insights of post modernism.

This line of thinking is severely challenged in the area of knowledge, evidence and certainty. We can if we wish undertake the imaginative exercise of living in Don Cupitt’s cave, assuming there is no contact with the outside world, telling each other stories to pass the time, but this is very far from the assumptions of the majority on how life is lived. It is also far from how the bible itself presents reality, with the assumptions that God speaks and we can hear His voice, and also that God works through history - and knowing about His workings in history is basic to belief in Him now.

This isn’t to say that we should take on a naive positivism about how we perceive things. But it does assume that things can be perceived, and that in the end language is our servant rather than our master, and there is some degree of balance between the weighting of objective and subjective realities.

This is also not to say that there does not need to be some, maybe radical, overhauling of the way truth is presented and packaged in the light of shifting cultural realities. But we should be careful about what we are jettisoning in the process. Andrew implies that the scholarly positioning of critical realism is a better basis for progress than church tradition (for instance), which will tend to impose an unhealthy dogmatism on theological discussion. Whilst I for one reject dogmatism, it seems to me that the faith community, the church as lived in everyday life throughout history, is the place where theology is tried and tested, rather than the detached world of the theological academy. The faith community is the place where wisdom is imparted by the workings of the Holy Spirit - and whilst this should be subject to critique from other ways of receiving insights, it should not be dismissed in too wholesale a fashion.

I’m all for the ethos of this website, which I assume is to explore the kind of ideas which lie at the top of this thread. The site is providing a ‘critique’ of theology (just as post modernism critiques modernism). But I’m already one step ahead, and feel that the critique itself needs, in turn, to be critiqued. Not that we should revert to by-gone dogma, but that the new steps being proposed should not in their turn become the new dogma.

Language truth and logic

I suppose we all come to this site with different mindsets, different views about what is important. My own intellectual formation derives principally from British analytic philosophy and it is from this standpoint that I make the following comments.

In my view, the concepts of modernism, post modernism and Cartesian inspired solipsism exercise a baleful influence over discussion in this site.

Post modernism
Post modernism, as far as I understand it, suggests that truth is a construction (expressing eg power or self interest) and therefore insists that we may not make any objective truth claims- truth is what is true for me. Kd5det accepts the post modernist assertion with its implication that we can know nothing of God but points out that it means we can know nothing of science either. Cold consolation, I would have thought.

I have read little post modernism but it strikes me as an idea which expands a minor insight (that the victors write the history) into a ravening monster of a theory. I really don’t want to spend time reading into it. On the other hand everybody else seems to take it seriously. Can anybody explain why?

Cartesian inspired solipsism
Some participants in this dialogue seem to have assimilated post modernism to Cartesian derived solipsism but the latter has a different basis, focussing on arguments that we can only know our own sensations.
Thus Albanach says
“and as we all know ‘cogito, ergo sum’ is the only true certainty. None of us can be certain of the existence of anything outside our own thoughts. Iand as we all know ‘cogito, ergo sum’ is the only true certainty. None of us can be certain of the existence of anything outside our own thoughts.”

I have two responses to this.

The short one is: it is ridiculous to believe that all the billions of usages of the word ‘know’ every day are mistaken. “Dear, do you know where my glasses are?” “No dear, I don’t and it will be no use looking since it is not possible to know anything.”

The long one is that this issue has been the major preoccupation of analytic philosophy, particularly the later Wittgenstein, for most of the last hundred years, but theology seems to be quite unaware of it (see “Theology after Wittgenstein” by Fergus Kerr).

Modernism
Modernism (also Enlightenment rationalism) I take to be the view that the only respectable knowledge is that which is completely objective, cause-effect empiricism. This is just another kind of metaphysics and seems to suffer from the fatal flaw that it’s own basic principle invalidates it ie it cannot itself be justified by cause effect empiricism.

This theory has suffered hammer blows over the lat 20 -30 years especially from Charles Taylor in his magisterial “Sources of the Self” but also from people like Bernard Williams and Alasdair McIntyre.

My question is: why do we feel obliged to make continual obeisances to this unholy trio in discussion of issues of faith, belief, knowledge, certainty?

I would suggest that the best starting point for such discussion is an examination of the way we use these concepts ie of their logical grammar. In the case of belief, for example, I think we tie ourselves into unnecessary knots by applying the logical grammar of opinion (belief that) to the logical grammar of faith (belief in)- points I have tried to make in my exchanges with erlenmeyer.

paulhartigan - just a thought

Paul - The Pyramid and the Net/David Clines (link through Andrew’s post on critical realism above, I found it on the printer friendly version) is a very good article on modernism/postmodernism, which I recommend in the light of your comments. (I read it after my last comment).

Thumbs down to post modernism

Peter
I have now had a look at the David Clines article and I am afraid it confirms me in my negative assessment of post modernism.

Some comments on specific claims made in the article:

Texts
Clines says that it is sometimes difficult to be sure what is the original text and then implies that we can never be sure. This is simply a logical non sequitur

Clines says old textual criticism was only interested in the original text and not in copies; whereas post modernism sees the distinction between original and copies as problematic. I do not find anything problematic in a distinction between originals and copies. If Clines really doubts this, he should try getting a new passport with a photocopy of his birth certificate. Of course there may be circumstances where copies are also important (eg illuminated manuscripts of the bible) but it did not need something called post modernism to tell us that.

On making generalisations
Clines says Old Testament theology wants the OT to be about one thing, to have a centre; whereas post modernism says it may not have a centre at all. One of the really refreshing things about NT Wright’s work is that he gives us the big picture, a project which Clines would presumably disapprove. It is of course true that any attempt to assemble a large complex of facts into a coherent whole may do so at the expense of the facts. It may be that no coherent generalisations can be made. Again, it did not need something called post modernism to tell us that; and the fact that in some cases no generalisations are possible does not mean they are never possible.

Dictionaries are far from what they seem
Clines says that dictionaries give the impression that the meaning of words is determinate;
“in fact they have a multiplicity of senses
and the multiplicity of senses puts the speaker and hearer and reader constantly on the qui vive, into a process of perpetual decision making that is ameliorated only by the routinization of most daily communications.”
This is simply nonsense. Some words are determinate (eg electron), some aren’t (eg philosophy). To get an idea of which are which, look up any dictionary or Thesaurus. The idea that all language users are chronically unsure of the meaning of the words they use is patently untrue( about which of the words in the preceding sentence were you confused by their multiplicity of senses and engaged in constant decision making?).

Clines says
“Dictionaries are ideological texts, like other texts, and they perform certain services for social cohesion and conformity; they are essentially conservative…….”
Clines thinks consultation of dictionaries to find out the meaning of words is incidental to their main use- which is to produce social cohesion and conformity. On this basis Clines would see no difference between the multi-volumed OED and a dictionary produced by Big Brother in Orwell’s 1984. How on earth could a lexicographer carry through the “essentially conservative” project- would he have to review all the hundreds of thousands of words in the dictionary to ensure that none with a radical change agenda snuck through? This is almost clinical paranoia.

Objective history is not possible
Clines says
“historians are themselves part of history, as much the subject of his tory as the events of the past…..”
Does that mean that if I say the Wehrmacht invaded Russia in 1941, I am making a statement about me as well as the Wehrmacht and Russia? And if so, what is the statement?

Clines goes on
[historians] are not objective observers standing outside the framework of some external reality they are trying to describe, but interested parties with some personal or institutional ideological investment in the business of reconstructing the past.”

Well, of course some historians have an axe to grind- David Irving is an example from the present, Josephus from the past. But it does not follow that every historian has an axe to grind.

Thumbs down?

Paul - I don’t think you realise the extent of the reach of postmodernism. To say ‘thumbs down’ to postmodernism is like saying thumbs down to post-Newtonian advances in physics; to people preferring relational communities rather than institutional organisations; to ‘flat’ leadership styles rather than hierarchies; to networking styles of working rather than working within ‘pyramidal’ structures; to personal explanations rather than ‘meta-narratives’; to stories rather than theories and propositions; the list is endless.

Above all, people of my generation (and maybe yours) will never understand people of the up-coming generation unless we try to understand aspects of the postmodern mindset. This has implications for the church - as there needs to be a church which will live and thrive in the postmodern culture. (Church-planters take note). The church I lead is like two churches - modern and post-modern alongside each other. At times it’s bewildering.

You may have picked out certain features of postmodernism which you find distasteful - and in that sense, postmodernism needs to be critiqued.

But as postmodernism is part of the very atmosphere that we are breathing, it can’t just be dismissed, as if we could live our lives in a different culture.

As regards what you say about David Clines, I’m not his apologist, but I have to say that I found some of your points more like ‘point-scoring’ rather than a serious attempt to take on board what he is saying.

I think one of the most important things Clines says is that postmodernism is an attempt to come to terms with our disappointments about modernism - which simply hasn’t delivered what it promised (though it has delivered much - that remains with us, and needs to be guarded).

Also I pointed out in my previous comment that N.T.Wright is indeed using the tools of modernism to provide material for a postmodern theology.

It’s stimulating to talk to you - thanks!

There is some justice in your suggestion.....BUT

Peter
Thanks for your response.

I suppose there are two questions
1. Does post modernism have anything to recommend it as a philosophy (movement?)
2. And, independently of that, has it secured such a strong foothold among theological scholars that it must be a part of any serious theological discussion.

As regards the first, there is some justice in your suggestion that the points I made in my last post were point scoring, in the sense that I did not approach David Clines article with much in the way of a positive attitude. On the other hand, there was little if anything in his text to dissipate such an attitude. The article purported to offer arguments for a number of post modernist claims but the arguments are totally inadequate, often based on the fallacy that if X is sometimes the case, X is always the case. In other instances what is suggested as a post modernist discovery is no more than what any well trained researcher or theorist would do (eg be on the lookout for bias in approaching the subject),

The shining stars in the postmodernist firmament are (I think) Derrida and Foucault. Charles Taylor, a Christian (Catholic) who enjoys a very high reputation among professional philosophers has this to say about them
“both these philosophers, different as they are, draw on a certain reading of Nietzche which has been popular in France in recent decades. It is a reading which focuses on Nietzche’s sense of the arbitrariness of interpretation, on interpretation as an imposition of power, but completely neglects the other facet of this baffling thinker, the Dionysian vision of the “eternal return” which makes possible the all-englobing affirmation of ‘yea-saying’….both want to disclaim any notion of the good. What they end up celebrating is the potential power and freedom of the self….Derrida and Foucault offer charters for subjectivism and the celebration of our own creative power at the cost of occluding what is spiritually arresting in the whole movement of contemporary culture.” Page 488-490 Sources of the Self

As I have said in previous posts, the effects of post modernism on the discussions in Open Source Theology is very negative with a number of participants claiming, for example, that we can never know anything. Such statements backed by well based argument are one thing; but are, to my mind, a blind alley if they arise from thought as shallow as that David Clines.

On the second point, I do not have much experience of academic theology so I do not know how entrenched post modernist thought is- though I notice that NT Wright frequently nods in its direction. However, if it is well entrenched, and if my criticisms are correct, then the only thing to do, it seems to me, is to fight it at every opportunity.

By the way, I also relish the exchanges possible on this site. People, even of very different views, genuinely try to understand and respond to each other. I am conscious that in expressing my own views I may be too assertoric and that this could cause offence. If so, please accept my apologies. And thanks for the opportunity to talk.

Deconstructing postmodernism

Paul - just to acknowledge your response - and like you, many Christians, I suspect, are alarmed at philosophical postmodernism because it seems to deny certainty in knowledge (and much else), which being the case, how we can we be certain about what we believe, the bible, God’s voice etc. The next step can be to demonise the postmodernists.

I’m not sure we need to go so far, and actually we can benefit from postmodernism - especially in its literary approach to texts. (Eg Job ‘deconstructs’ a traditional view of sin and suffering; the bible provides its own critique of patriarchy etc). Postmodernism can also help us in taking a fresh perspective on power systems - not least religion, and that associated with our supposed ideas of God. Since Jesus seems to elude all of these systems, I think he is the postmodern figure for our times par excellence.

Having a background in neither academic philosophy nor theology, but in literature, I suppose I warm to this approach. Somebody said anyway that deconstruction is less a philosophy and more a philosophy of reading. But maybe someone with better understanding than myself could comment.

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