In a recent post, I started fleshing out what I call the irony of theological realism—namely, an irony that flourishes on the assertion of an unmediated reality that one can only know and communicate via narrative.
The irony is made possible by an initial commitment, or presumption, about the nature of reality. Basically, the presumption theological realists make is two part: 1) narratives more or less accurately refer to 2) a world of events that are prior to, or separate from, the narratives that people tell.
The irony of theological realism can be avoided by altering one’s initial commitment regarding the nature of reality. Instead of the dualism of theological realism, one can presume: 1) narratives are more or less fruitful at 2) effecting a world into existence.
As I’ve suggested in other OST posts, this second view that over comes the irony of theological realism offers a more consistent reading of the Holy Bible and the role of language. In Genesis, for instance, God said “Let there be light” and there was light. God spoke the world into existence, in other words. Similarly, God gave man the capacity to name the animals; that is, to effect “lions” and “monkeys” and “cows” and “donkeys” into existence. Or consider Jesus who was the word made flesh. Through his words and wonders, and our indwelling in His way of relating to ourselves, our neighbors and our God, the Lord’s kingdom can be wholly and completely effected on earth as it is in heaven.
Avoiding the realist’s dilemma entails that we see our words and names as more or less fruitful ways of effecting a world into existence. The truth is not out there for our narratives to touch, I would argue—we will never reach back through history and touch the original event. Rather, through narratives we are able to indwell in the truth and light of Jesus’ way, as made discernable through the Bible, the Holy Spirit and our faith communities, and thus move forward toward the kingdom of our God as one diverse body.

Re: Initial Commitments
I like where you’re going here, Jacob. Here are a few thoughts that come to mind.
"1) narratives are more or less fruitful at 2) effecting a world into existence."
I would describe Baruch Spinoza’s elaboration on this idea if only I’d actually read Spinoza. He’s undergoing a sort of revival, largely because of his thoroughgoing commitment to immanence as the means by which worlds come into existence. Spinoza, a Jew, resisted the mind-body dualism inherited from the Greeks and systematized by Descartes. For Spinoza the ideas of God and the words He speaks are not essentially different from the materiality by which He also manifests himself. Humans too are mistakenly divided into mind and body. I think that for Spinoza, people’s ideas originate from and/or resonate with God’s idea, their creative actions with God’s ongoing creation. One gets a pantheistic vibe from Spinoza, at least as I’ve heard his ideas described.
Alternatively there are the social constructionists, following sociologists Berger and Luckmann’s Social Construction of Reality, which I actually have read and which I do recommend. Their position is that existing material stuff doesn’t become meaningful reality until it’s been thought about, categorized, named, and assembled into a coherent structural whole. B&L don’t go as far as Spinoza, or possibly as you do, in dismantling the distinction between the material and the conceptual. Still, a pre-existing material something isn’t experienced subjectively or collectively as having reality until it’s been embedded in the mental and linguistic order of things.
"God spoke the world into existence, in other words. Similarly, God gave man the capacity to name the animals; that is, to effect “lions” and “monkeys” and “cows” and “donkeys” into existence."
Your construal here sounds more like Spinoza’s immanent position on realism. For Berger and Luckmann, the world and the animals might have existed before being named; they just hadn’t entered into meaningful reality yet.
"we will never reach back through history and touch the original event."
This is a puzzle currently being explored by contemporary "speculative realists" in continental philosophy, notably Ray Brassier, Graham Harman, Bruno Latour, and Quentin Meillassoux. This last fellow in his short but dense book After Finitude is trying to understand the "arche-fossil," the world as it existed before sentient beings inhabited that world. The question is this: How is it possible to think about things that existed before there was human thought? Empirical science claims to do just that in investigating long-term environmental change and evolution, the big bang and the expanding universe, etc. Meillassoux wants not to debunk science but to arrive at a philosophical understanding of how and why it might be possible.
Re: Initial Commitments
Thanks for the comments.
The Sacred Canopy, which is by Berger, is also a good read that makes one think about the sociality of theology.
Re: Initial Commitments
"In Genesis, for instance, God said “Let there be light” and there was light. God spoke the world into existence, in other words. Similarly, God gave man the capacity to name the animals; that is, to effect “lions” and “monkeys” and “cows” and “donkeys” into existence."
It seems that the writer of the second creation narrative intended to distinguish the thing from its name, its material existence from its socially constructed reality. The thing comes first, then the agreed-upon meaning of that thing. The writer of the first creation narrative conflates these two operations, perhaps even inverts them: the name comes first, then the thing to which the name applies.
If we follow Berger and Luckmann (both Lutherans, I believe), the purpose of religion is to weld the names to the things so tightly that they cannot be pulled apart without risking chaos. It’s what B&L refer to as the "reification" of reality. Here’s a passage from their Social Construction of Reality:
By implication, humans can follow the examples of creation given in Genesis 1 and 2 in two fundamentally different ways. First, we can accept reified reality as its been handed down through the religion: the names are integral to the things, unchangeable, built into their creation as things, so that if we abandon the names then the material world will fall apart. Or we can recognize that, like Adam, we are the ones who assign names to things, and that by changing the names we can rearrange reality — our understanding of what things mean and how they fit together — without the whole world descending into chaos. We can stop thinking about the sky as a firmament separating the waters above from the waters below without the risk of precipitating another cosmic-scale deluge.
Re: Initial Commitments
And the two fundamentally different directions are, I would say, rooted in a set of initial commitments. Do we follow Genesis 1 or 2? I follow 1 explicitly and attempt to push the logic of that commitment. I would argue that Andrew follows the second commitment, but less explicitly. I feel that he forgets his authorship, his commitment, his agency in formulating his position and, instead, conflates his theological realism with The Way The Bible Is and with What Jesus Did.
Either way, what I think is of the utmost importance is that we see that without our active reading, the Bible says nothing. There is a fundamental agency in reading, in our construction of what the text means in our time and place.
Also important, I think, is that even if the writer of Genesis 2 wanted to insert a fundamental distinction between a thing from its name, that distinction is composed of words, of symbolic representations. Put differently, even though "Yahweh Elohim formed every beast of the field and every bird of the heavens, and brought them to the man to see what he would call them," the writer used words to formulate this distinction between thing and word. In that sense, the distinction is a linguistic representation of how things are and not an unmediated description of How Things Are.
Re: Initial Commitments
Oh, so you’re trying to lure Andrew into debate, are you, Jacob, appertaining to some line of reasong which I’ve not been following? Well then, I’ll just let you enjoy the wait in solitude while I return to the spiteful obscurity from which I occasionally venture forth, dragging my (insightful and valuable, not to mention constructive) thoughts back into the cave with me. Not that I don’t find your language-mediated thoughts provocative…
Re: Initial Commitments
No, no. Please don’t interpret my reference to Andrew as excluding you. I’m looking for interaction with others—you, Andrew or anyone else who is interested in participating is welcome.
I often call out Andrew because it is his site. In a relational way, we always have those that we build up against. Jesus had the Devil, I have Andrew ;-)
Re: Initial Commitments
A bit like Saul calling up the spirit of Samuel through the witch of Endor, perhaps? Or would it be a different illustration of the power of reification? (Just a quick thought from the cave in which I have been temporarily skulking).
Re: Initial Commitments
Maybe both.
Perhaps its like a Samaritan acting more Godly than self-identified followers of the God of Israel?
Or maybe like Peter Berger and Norbert Elias say at different times in different places, reification is a problem with human language use? It is hard to avoid when you speak. The difference, I would submit, is that I try to be up front with that point, admit to it, and not forget my authorship.
You should come out of your cave more often.
Re: Initial Commitments
It’s curious how many drastic actions are justified in the name of preventing chaos. America and associates’ continued occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan prevents political chaos, the governmental bailouts of the big banks prevent economic chaos, etc. This sort of hyperbole exemplifies the language of reification, where the dominant sectors of society claim to be holding the universe together. The mystifying words which descend from on high: do they describe reality, or create it? Of course it’s possible to identify religious examples as well: the Law and the priesthood prevent moral chaos, etc.
Re: Initial Commitments
At last, a root metaphor. In the beginning, before God there was freedom (see Berdeyev), which is another word for chaos. There was the water, an ancient metaphor for chaos. And God caused his breath to blow over the water. He ordered being—perfectly. Man, in his image and likeness—orders being—imperfectly. At the eschaton, which is proleptic, the perfect order of God and the imperfect order of man will be merged through justice, and in order there will be unity which is to say perfect simplicity, which can never be chaotic.
Happy Thanksgiving to you all and may you have a blessed day.
Re: Initial Commitments
Happy Thanksgiving to you too, Shiert. I wonder if the English, Australian and other Anglophone participants in this blog have ever eaten pumpkin pie, the classic Thanksgiving dessert. When we lived in France and served it to French people, reactions ranged from incredulity to revulsion.
Regarding humanity’s imperfect ordering of being, there’s this from American journalist Ron Suskind:
Re: Initial Commitments
“A designer knows he has achieved perfection not when there is nothing left to add, but when there is nothing left to take away.”
— Antoine de Saint-Exupery
Re: Initial Commitments
Of course we could take Saint-Exupery’s epigram to its nihilistic enpoint, whereby creation is perfected in total destruction. Here’s an earlier Frenchman’s minimalist maxim, oft unheeded in these parts: